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This dissertation examines the techniques and themes of William Burroughs by
placing him in the American Pragmatist tradition.  Chapter One presents a pragmatic
critical approach to literature based on Richard Rorty and John Dewey, focusing on the
primacy of narration over argumentation, redescription and dialectic, the importance of
texts as experiences, the end-products of textual experiences, and the role of critic as
guide to experience rather than judge.  Chapter Two uses this pragmatic critical lens to
focus on the writing techniques of William Burroughs as a part of the American
Pragmatist tradition, with most of the focus on his controversial cut-up technique.
Burroughs is a writer who upsets many of the traditional expectations of the literary
writing community, just as Rorty challenges the conventions of the philosophical
discourse community.  Chapter Three places Burroughs within a liberal democratic
tradition with respect to Rorty and John Stuart Mill.  Burroughs is a champion of
individual liberty; this chapter shows how Burroughs’ works are meant to edify readers
about the social, political, biological, and technological systems which work to control
individuals and limit their liberties and understandings.  The chapter also shows how
Burroughs’ works help liberate readers from all control systems, and examines the
alternative societies he envisions which work to uphold, rather than subvert, the freedom
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This dissertation presents a synthesis of the pragmatic techniques and ideas of
Richard Rorty and William S. Burroughs.  One works in philosophy and the other in
literature, but they both seek to extend the practice of liberal values in our society.  Their
unusual writing styles, which are a consequence of their pragmatism, challenge readers
through the use of redescription instead of argumentation.  Richard Rorty calls this
preference the primacy of literature over philosophy as a means of cultural discourse that
leads to change.
The first time I read Richard Rorty, I realized he did not sound like other
contemporary philosophers, although I was not sure why.  In graduate school, (like most
everyone else in our profession) I cut my intellectual teeth on French and German
postmodernists, such as Derrida, Lacan, and Heidegger.  Although reading them changed
the way I thought about theory and language from a positivist, rationalist viewpoint to a
more open-ended and historicist one, I never really enjoyed reading postmodern
philosophy until I encountered Rorty in a graduate American Literature seminar.  All
those arcane European thinkers had left me cold; they didn't spark much critical inquiry
on my part, no doubt a result of my own laborious pains in deciphering their often-elusive
prose.
Rorty's prose, on the other hand, filled me with exciting possibilities.  I was
actually enjoying the process of wrestling with difficult passages.  More importantly, I
was better able to connect the theoretical framework to my own literary critiques.  Like
me, Rorty was not interested in lengthy, abstract discussions of first principles, nor did
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his writing revolve around bizarre French puns.  Instead, he told stories, asked difficult
but engaging questions, and looked into the end results of his ideas.  Most essentially, he
offered more than just a different perspective; he made me aware that the interplay of a
variety of perspectives was more fruitful than any single perspective, and that this
shifting of narrative perspective was an acceptable strategy for writers.
When I began to consider American Literature in the context of Rorty’s thought, I
gained a greater understanding of both. I decided to focus my Rortyean analysis on one of
the American authors I found most challenging:  William Burroughs.  Research and study
affirmed what I had already intuited, that both authors share similar attitudes towards
narrative and language.  Burroughs writes novels that are not really novels; they are one
work broken up into pieces, connected by recurring themes, images, and characters.
Burroughs puts into practice pragmatic ideas about the free play of narrative voices and
the elusive, self-referential qualities of writing itself.
Rorty writes philosophy that is not really philosophy, because he generally
ignores many of the discourse conventions of his field. Rorty does not seek a single,
unifying perspective which would explain everything.  He does not expound basic
principles, engage in analysis of proofs, or even agree that logical argumentation is
always the best mode of discourse for intellectuals.  According to him, such methods
represent a useful break from the traditions of philosophical discourse, but some of his
critics think that he works outside of the boundaries for practitioners of their discipline.
I see both of these writers as coming out of the only native philosophical tradition
we have, American Pragmatism.  Pierce and James are the two earliest exponents of this
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tradition, and Dewey, who is the pragmatist I look at most closely after Rorty, did even
more during the twentieth century to bring pragmatic ideas into social and governmental
policy.  This tradition is not concerned with justifying the democratic, liberal principles
of our country so much as it is involved with extending and improving democracy and
the quality of life of the people.  Putting Rorty and Burroughs together into the  narrative
framework of American Pragmatism helped me understand what each one is trying to do
better than I could by trying to comprehend either singly.  Both present a number of
difficulties to the unsuspecting reader, because they break or suspend many of the rules
of their discourse communities.  Learning to work outside of these rules can be as




This project, then, displays the results of my Richard Rorty-William Burroughs
research.  I'll begin in this chapter with my reading of Rorty's work, explaining his basic
tools and concepts  and analyzing what makes him valuable to American thought in
general and American Literature in particular. To this I will add some thoughts from of
one of his primary influences, John Dewey, and use  the combination of the two to show
how pragmatism can be used to understand artistic works and promote better criticism. In
the later chapters, I will use pragmatism to get a critical perspective on William
Burroughs, showing how his writing can be better understood when given a pragmatic
reading, largely because Burroughs had a pragmatist approach to his craft.  His
techniques are specifically geared towards pragmatic ends; indeed his whole outlook is
pragmatic.  Like Rorty, Burroughs is not interested in first principles but rather in the
end-products of ideas.
Richard Rorty published Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity in 1989, and of all his
books this work says the most about the relationship between philosophy, literature, and
pragmatism.  Although I want and need to use Rorty's terms in order to explain his
concepts, I won't necessarily stick to his organizational framework or provide a point-by-
point study of any of his books.   Because my purposes are different from his, I will
present pragmatism from a literary critic's viewpoint, emphasizing some points because
of their close connection to my analysis of William Burroughs, while omitting other
important ideas he has because they bear little direct relation to my project. Rorty's ideas
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about foundations seem to be one of the most difficult sticking points for analytical
thinkers, so let us begin there.
Rorty uses the term contingency to describe some of his ideas about people,
culture, and language.  The far-reaching implications of contingency are difficult to grasp
at first because our language and culture are designed to allow us to avoid them.  For
starters, let us say that contingency means nothing is ever fixed, destined, or
predetermined; everything is up for grabs.  For example, a student of philosophy might
begin by inquiring what definition Rorty has for human nature, but already she has run
into a difficulty, due to inherent differences between her preferred methods of discourse
and Rorty’s.  The question presupposes that Rorty thinks that there is some kind of
essence which a definition of human nature could capture and describe.  But Rorty does
not want to write that way.  He does, at times, offer descriptions which we may want to
think of as definitions, but they are used pragmatically in certain contexts to achieve
certain ends.  They are not attempts to “define” in the sense of capturing some sort of
essence.  What makes Rorty slippery for foundationalists  (people who look for an
absolute metaphysical framework for their world-view) is his complete disinterest in
making such definitions.  Rorty describes himself as a nominalist and a historicist.  This
means that he finds such terms as “human nature,” “destiny,” “truth,” etc., to mean only
what a given person wants them to mean.  People have no essence which they share with
all others, which would define what it is to be human.
The absence of a concrete, distinct self forms a disturbing stumbling block for
people who are used to thinking as though human beings have a stable, essential, core
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identity which connects them to all others and provides a reliable means for judging
human actions and ideas.  Existentialism, which also states that people have no innate set
of qualities, likewise proves unpalatable for many people because they fear a world in
which people are not inextricably linked to each other by a binding set of traits which sets
boundaries on their actions and identities.  The idea of the core identity is an important
and pervasive one in Western thought, and is the basis for many scientific, social, and
popular practices.  Most forms of psychoanalysis, for example, are predicated on the idea
that there is a damaged “self” inside the person that the analyst must find and repair.  In
many conservative circles, drug addiction is not a physical, medical condition but a flaw
of the personality, and this belief conveniently allows society to punish rather than
attempt to medically cure the addict.
Rorty believes ideas like “human nature” are a holdover from the Enlightenment
period, when religious explanations of the world and human behavior were going out of
favor, so people began to devise secular, scientific, and rationalist terms to replace the
spiritual ones they had used before.  We still use phrases like "human nature" in order to
convince ourselves and others that people have to behave in certain ways, and when
people behave badly, they must therefore have transgressed against something important
we all share.  In other words, we have constructed ideal models of humanity in order to
shape society because we believe there must be something universal within us that can
provide grounds for judging human actions.  This sense of a limiting force on human
freedom, of "standards of decency," helps calm our fears that the world is chaotic and
gives us a sense of order and purpose.
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If society were to follow Rorty and successfully dispense with the idea of the core
identity, leaving people without the concept of a stable self to fall back upon, many
would then refer to their community as a safe repository of identity, hopes, and dreams.
By identifying themselves as members of a particular group, people can then adopt the
qualities and purposes of that group, removing their fears that life may be meaningless,
allowing them to ground their lives in something powerful, immutable, even (to them)
eternal.
Rorty understands why people are comforted by such beliefs, but he thinks it is
high time we moved past them.  Collectively human beings are just as contingent as they
are individually.  No society (nor all of humanity) has any intrinsic nature or inescapable
destiny.  Although it may sound trivial to imagine that we are all products of time and
chance, it is also liberating to realize that our horizons are not limited by some
transcendent order or set of capacities called “human nature.”  We have the freedom to
shape ourselves and our societies into anything we want them to be, given enough time,
effort, and resources.  Rorty calls this the "contingency of self" and "contingency of
community."
Although Rorty chooses not to define humans, he does offer a historicist
description of them as "centerless webs."  Our identities are not single, coherent, unified
things; they are a conglomeration of small details:  who our parents were, the society we
grew up in, the friendships we formed as children, our educational background, and other
specific, historically-determined circumstances and experiences.  Although there exists
no essential "I," there is a provisional “I” which changes with time and context.  What we
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think of as human nature are either contingently-determined similarities between
ourselves and others or just wishful thinking.
As we grow up, constructing our selves, we form what Rorty calls our "final
vocabulary":  "the words in which we tell, sometimes prospectively and sometimes
retrospectively, the story of our lives" (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 73).  As they
are based on our contingent lives, final vocabularies are thus contingent as well, formed
by discrete historical circumstances.  The vocabulary is "final" because "those words are
as far as [one] can go with language; beyond them there is only helpless passivity or a
resort to force" (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 73).  However, most people,
especially those Rorty calls "foundationalists," think of their final vocabularies as given,
not created.  They prefer so much to think of them in this way that they are easily shaken
and hurt by anyone who might call the terms of their final vocabulary into question.
Rorty has a name for those people who especially relish questioning final vocabularies:
ironists.  Rorty has a more detailed description of this term, one which will require that
we understand how Rorty presents the contingency of language.
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty deals with the linguistic and
conceptual holdovers from the Enlightenment.  As suggested by the title, his primary
interest is in the image of the mind as a thing which reflects nature, showing us what is
"out there," beyond ourselves and our language.  Rorty’s problem with this metaphor is
that it has led Western thought to focus on "accuracy of representation,"  with all its
attendant problems, questions, and hierarchies.  Philosophers seem to have forgotten that
the mirror of nature is just a metaphor, since they focus all their efforts and arguments on
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which philosophical systems offer the greatest clarity in the mind's mirror.  Rorty
deconstructs the mirror by using Wittgenstein's anti-representationalism, Heidegger's
historicism, and Dewey's social awareness, and suggests that we replace "the ideal of
objective cognition" with an ideal of "aesthetic enhancement" (Mirror 13).  In other
words, we should drop the search for a better mirror, and work instead on "edification",
the "project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking"
(Mirror 360).  Rorty concludes that there are no privileged discourses which can capture
the "essence of man," because such an essence is a chimera.  There are, however,  a wide
variety of alternative descriptions of ourselves and our world:  poetic, philosophic,
scientific, and religious, among others, and each of them has its uses, but none of them
has an exact correlation to nature. Rorty later amplifies these ideas about the contingency
of language in the first chapter of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity:  "Truth cannot be
out there--cannot exist independently of the human mind--because sentences cannot so
exist, or be out there.  The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not.  Only
descriptions of the world can be true or false.  The world on its own--unaided by the
describing activities of human beings--cannot" (5). When we think of language and
nature as having a one-to-one relationship, the search for the perfect mirror becomes an
obsession.  This has led us to take for granted all the essentialist metaphors in our thought
patterns.  When we take metaphors seriously, as though they were literally true, we have
severely limited our capacity for flexibility and adaptation in our thoughts and speech.
Now we may turn our attention to Rorty's three-part definition of an ironist.  First,
Rorty tells us that an ironist has “radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary
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she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies
taken as final by people or books she has encountered” (Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity 73).  The “radical and continuing doubts” indicate that being an ironist is a
matter of perspective, of regarding one’s final vocabulary as an always-ongoing work in
progress. The ironist therefore takes every element in her final vocabulary as provisional
and subject to new alterations.  Her source for these changes lies in other people’s texts,
in the persuasive power of their language which causes her to adopt their modes of
speech. “Radical” also implies that at least some of the changes ironists make are not
trivial or cosmetic, but can lead to drastically different perspectives and outcomes.  Being
comfortable with these kinds of changes is one of the most challenging aspects of being
an ironist.  Few people, even those often considered to be unique artists or thinkers, can
handle major alterations in the way they understand themselves and their world.  Because
of their unusual habit of taking all “essential” terms as provisional, ironists see nothing
wrong with switching back and forth between competing perspectives, of never having
irrevocable premises or unshakable principles.  As a result, ironists also tend to receive
harsh criticism and outright hostility from those who want to assert that one (and only
one) viewpoint is “the right one.”  Pragmatism as a whole, in fact, is frequently equated
with slippery-slope relativism, a dark pit of amoral philosophy, out of which nothing
good can emerge. Therefore any writer with an ironist attitude will frequently be subject
to attack. Foundationalists make this sort of attack because they cannot “make sense” in
an objectively realistic way out of a system of thought which does not depend upon first
principles. Pragmatists point out that we don’t always need first principles in order to act.
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We don’t stop to consider the principles behind each and every action we perform on a
daily basis, and if we did we would not get much done.  We do hundreds of routine tasks
not out of carefully reasoned principles, but rather because they get us the results we
want.
Second, Rorty tells us that an ironist “realizes that argument phrased in her
present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts” that she has about
final vocabularies (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 73).  Ironists recognize the
circular, limited nature of a given way of speaking, which is why they play vocabularies
against each other.  In doing so, they reveal the strengths and limitations of the
perspectives they are using, and do so more effectively than they could using logic alone.
The idea of the unbiased, logical interlocutor seems a bit ridiculous to the ironist, who
believes that such a position is impossible for any person to attain. Pragmatists believe
that logic and argumentation, although useful tools in many contexts, are not the only
tools at our disposal and do not deserve privileged status.  The ironist must become
comfortable with doubts and uncertainties, because every adoptable position will have
them.
Third and finally, Rorty describes the ironist’s attitude towards language and
reality: “insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her
vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself”
(Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 73).  In other words, the ironist does not try to use a
foundationalist approach to language by using the “mirror of nature” metaphor in order to
claim that her way of speaking is more “right” or “real” than someone else’s.  She
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understands that words are self-referential tools, and that words only refer to other words,
not to some objectively certifiable “reality” beyond language.
Having said all this about the ironist, we may now get the impression that such a
person is incapable of mounting a coherent opinion, much less sustaining a serious
dialogue.  When we look at what Rorty does with pragmatism, we can see that his
awareness of the contingency of language and culture does not prevent him from
adopting a liberal stance.  Borrowing from Judith Shklar, Rorty describes himself as part
of the liberal community, which believes that “cruelty is the worst thing we do.”  The
capacity for suffering, which we all share, allows us to identify even with those whom we
might otherwise reject as alien to ourselves, and Rorty feels this identification can
engender human solidarity.  “But that solidarity is not thought of as recognition of a core
self, the human essence, in all human beings.  Rather, it is thought of as the ability to see
more and more traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs, and the like) as
unimportant when compared with respect to pain and humiliation –the ability to think of
people wildly different from ourselves as included in the range of ‘us’” (Contingency,
Irony, and Solidarity 192).  Although Rorty’s liberal ideals and the democratic principles
of the Enlightenment (such as Justice, Government by Consent, and Inalienable Human
Rights)  have no more foundation than do personal preferences about food, Rorty
believes we can still support them: “The fundamental premise of the book is that a belief
can still regulate action, can still be thought worth dying for, among people who are quite
aware that this belief is caused by nothing deeper than contingent historical
circumstance” (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 189).  The principles involved hold
13
value for us not because they originate out of something timeless and unquestionable.
The values we cherish in liberal intellectual circles (and Rorty makes it clear this is his
primary intended audience) are worthwhile because they allow us to act in the present
and to imagine a brighter future.  Simply put, these ideals make our lives better, a “cash-
value” in pragmatic terminology.  Our society and its operating principles are just as
contingent as our personal lives, but this realization is no cause for alarm.  We do not
need to justify liberal democracy, we need to make it work for us all, and improve it
where we can.  Rather than extending theory, we need to improve and extend the practice
of liberal democracy.
This optimistic attitude lies behind Rorty’s latest work, Achieving our Country,
wherein Rorty tells us that the best thing about community is our hope that it can be made
better.  He focuses on the ways in which artists of all kinds, especially writers, have the
power to shape our country by suggesting directions we might want to take (or avoid!).
Only by envisioning a better future does that future become possible.  Therefore, when
evaluating a writer’s work, we ought to ask ourselves what contribution to future vision
this writer makes.
With this attitude towards art and writers, Rorty places himself alongside his
pragmatic precursor, John Dewey.  In order to understand pragmatic criticism, it will be
useful for us to spend some time investigating how Dewey describes the complex
relationships between experience, art, artists, critics, and society.  In Art as Experience,
Dewey says that an artist as one who is gifted in perceiving and processing experience,
which is the “raw material” of art.  The artist then uses this processed experience to
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create works of art, which are vehicles of some sort of expression.  Dewey is using
“expression” here in a very particular way.  He doesn’t just mean an utterance,
description,  or representation of emotion or idea:  “instead of a description of an emotion
in intellectual and symbolic terms, the artist ‘does the deed that breeds’ the emotion” (Art
as Experience 67).  In other words, art doesn’t just communicate emotion, it engenders it.
For this engendering to occur, those who view this vehicle of expression must
perform the same task as the artist; they must perceive clearly, experience, and process
that experience into meaningful terms, into some sort of expression. Thus, a work of art
not just a thing in itself, it is also a process, an interaction between the art and audience.
Art is both the object which inspires an expression and the expression itself; it is both
medium and message.  The receiver of a work of art, whether a member of the general
public or a specially trained critic, goes through a process similar to that of the artist:
processing the experience so as to make some of kind of sense of it.  When we assimilate
a work of art we make an expression of it to ourselves, even if that expression is only
puzzlement or distaste.  So, when we academicians and other professional appraisers
criticize art, we should try to understand its expression and give others a sense of how
well the artistic object serves as a vehicle of expression. We critics should ask ourselves,
does the art as medium do a good job of delivering an artistic expression?  We can break
the art up, arbitrarily, in order to analyze parts, or we can view both its method and its
impact as an indivisible whole.  Often, our understanding is best served when we do both,
rather than choosing one viewpoint over the other.
Beyond just the impact it has on individual viewers, what gives all art real-world,
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political implications is its potential to affect perception on a large scale, to change the
beliefs and attitudes of a whole culture.  In other words, when we are open to the
experience of art, we see not just a picture of a young woman coyly smiling or a poetic
description of a jar placed on a hill in Tennessee; we see a whole new range of
possibilities of being and expression of being that we never imagined before.  We may be
led to think about what our standards of beauty really are, or what kind of impact human
technology has on the natural environment.  Art can lead us to question assumptions and
challenge the status quo, and a pragmatic thinker is always interested in these kinds of
end-results of experience.  Pragmatists are always looking for ways to tie ideas to specific
practices, and therefore they are also looking for new ideas which may lead to better
practices.  The critic’s job is to help us (other scholars and the general public) experience
art in this way to the fullest extent possible. We can not only help people better
understand art and appreciate its aesthetic qualities, we can help them understand its
significance in the bigger cultural/political picture, and help them make connections
between the issues brought up in art and issues in their own lives.  To round out this
abbreviated presentation of Dewey’s complex description of art, let us add his outline of
the common problems and difficulties in criticism, so that when we later combine Dewey
and Rorty, we will have a workable model of pragmatic criticism’s purposes and
methods.
Too often, Dewey notes, criticism seeks not just better understanding of art, but
an excuse for bestowing moral judgment: “criticism is thought of as if its business were
not explication of the content of an object as to substance and form, but a process of
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acquittal or condemnation on the basis of merits and demerits” (Art as Experience 299).
The problem is not that critics exercise judgment, for Dewey tells us that “criticism is
judgment, ideally as well as etymologically” (Art as Experience 298), rather that critics
rush to make hasty judgment, and their single goal is to pronounce sentence upon art
without trying to perceive the work clearly and come to a better understanding of it.  This
sort of peremptory judgment often stems from “subconscious self-distrust and a
consequent appeal to authority for protection” (Art as Experience 299).  Dewey states
that negligent critics find it much easier to refer to authority than to do the hard and
complicated work of perceiving and processing, and so will choose to ignore direct
perception in favor of established norms and precedents, making the work fit the theory.
Setting up universal standards of judgment based upon acknowledged masterpieces from
the past only encourages imitation in art.  Rorty seconds Dewey’s rejection of arbitrary
judgment, saying “criticism is a matter of looking on this picture and on that, not of
comparing both pictures with the original” (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 80).
Judging art by past standards, real or ideal, ignores one of the most commonplace
observations about life: it constantly changes. Therefore, so should the art which
expresses its visions.  Art must be able “to cope with the emergence of new modes of
life–of experiences that demand new modes of expression” (Art as Experience 303).
Without recognition of new avenues of artistic creativity, criticism becomes conservative,
reactionary, limited in understanding, and ultimately useless.i
In order to get useful criticism, we must begin with “control of the subject-matter
of perception,” because “criticism is always determined by the quality of first-hand
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perception” (Art as Experience 298).    In order to see a work clearly, there are a number
of pitfalls we must avoid.  First, we need to be aware of the traditions, customs, and
precedents applicable to the work in question.  We should not be ruled by them, lest we
fall into the trap of conservatism already mentioned, but we should not bury our heads
and pretend that we know nothing about traditions, either.  “There is no art in which there
is only a single tradition.  The critic who is not intimately aware of a variety of traditions
is of necessity limited and his criticisms will be one-sided to the point of distortion” (Art
as Experience 311).  Seeing clearly is not just a matter of keeping an open mind, although
that attitude is valuable.  Seeing clearly also means knowing how a given work fits with
past categories, so that we can better appreciate it within artistic and cultural contexts.
This also heightens our awareness of how the work transcends traditional categories and
breaks new ground.  Knowledge of tradition could also lead to narrow categories of art,
so we must balance our use of traditions with an avoidance of useless comparisons to
other works and an avoidance of arbitrary standards.  Facile, pointless comparisons and
slavish adherence to past standards lead to stagnation; only that which fits easily into pre-
existing categories and easily-applied critical formulae receives praise.
While taking the history of art or a particular genre into account, we should also
look at the career history of the artist in question.  The artist’s body of work, viewed as a
whole, provides perspective on how that artist has developed: “In most cases, the
discrimination of a critic has to be assisted by a knowledge of the development of an
artist, as this is manifested in the succession of his works.  Only rarely can an artist be
criticized by a single specimen of his activity” (Art as Experience 312).  Not only are
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some works better or more accessible than others by the same artist, but trends and
themes which appear only briefly at one point may burst into full prominence later in the
artist’s career.  As critics, we will have a broader view and greater depth of understanding
if we follow artists through each stage of development. The point Dewey makes is not
that art history should determine our judgments, but rather that we the critics need to have
breadth of experience and depth of understanding.  If we have only read one novel or
seen one painting, our views of the works of other novelists and painters will most likely
be shallow and immature.  We critics should think of ourselves not as judges, but as
experienced interpreters of artistic expression.  The wider our range of experiences, the
better our chances of understanding the implications of a given body of work.
So, if we are ready to take into account art history and career history when
appropriate to gaining depth of understanding, and we avoid the pitfalls of misleading
critical approaches, we should have the necessary conditions for clear perception of our
subject-matter.  What we must do now is critique it.  Dewey, who is more interested in
discussing the nuts and bolts of criticism than Rorty, tells us that criticism consists of
both analysis (breaking the subject-matter down into parts) and synthesis (creating unity
and thematizing), saying "judgments have a common form because they all have certain
functions to perform.  These functions are discrimination and unification.  Judgment has
to evoke a clearer consciousness of constituent parts and to discover how consistently
these parts are related to form a whole" (Art as Experience 310).
Stating the uses of analysis still begs the question of how we shall perform our
analysis, leaving us wondering which parts we shall pick out to exemplify some
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synthesized theme.  Dewey believes critics must act out of "a consuming informed
interest," which means that we use our best judgment, based on our own idiosyncratic
final vocabularies, guided by both our love of art and our knowledge of relevant artistic
traditions.  A critic with no involvement in his subject-matter will perform cold,
mechanical analysis with little sensitivity to the emotional impact the work might offer.
A critic consumed wholly by personal biases and preferences, with no objectivity or basis
of reference, may miss important clues which could have led to a more meaningful
analysis.  Using both emotions and intellect to weave a critical pattern that provides
access to the art in question is the challenge of analysis  which Dewey calls "a test of the
mind of the critic" (Art as Experience 310). The test is difficult because there are no sure,
immutable principles by which we can operate.  By recognizing that all our critical
choices are arbitrary, including which works we analyze as well as how we choose to
break up works into parts, we extend the possibilities for enlarging our understanding of
art and avoid wasting time arguing about limitations and rules.
Synthesis balances out the critical scales of judgment by unifying what analysis
has broken down, for "without a unifying point of view, based on the objective form of a
work of art, criticism ends in enumeration of details" (Art as Experience 314).
Ultimately, a critical project succeeds only when its audience is given something, some
perspective which offers a richer, more varied, distinct understanding of the art in
question. The critic needs to provide a structured, unified narrative of the artistic
experience, based on "some strain or strand that is actually there, and bring it forth with
such clearness that the reader has a new clue and guide to his own experience" (Art as
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Experience 314).  The unifying theme offered by the critic should not be a
conglomeration of glittering generalities, vague and unsupported.  The idea is to use
synthesis to highlight specific features in the text which can then be used to illustrate the
critic's synthesized theme.  Although pragmatists acknowledge that truth is created rather
than found, critics should not speak for the artist in ways that mislead readers by
manufacturing that for which even they cannot find evidence.  Rather, critics should offer
a narrative which blends sensibly with that of the artist, to be in a dialogue with her, and
to try to weave a narrative around objectively discernable traits in her actual text.
If we avoid the pitfalls of shallow criticism and we analyze and synthesize
skillfully, we should be able to construct a useful narrative.  I mean "useful" in two ways.
First, there is the end-product of the artistic experience itself, meaning the sort of artistic
experience we are led to have by the artist. When we critics remain receptive and
sensitive to the end-product of a work, we are able to put our entire process of synthesis
and analysis into a meaningful context.  Rorty calls our attention to the wide variety of
possible ends, saying "Different writers want to do different things.  Proust wanted
autonomy and beauty; Nietzsche and Heidegger wanted autonomy and sublimity;
Nabokov wanted beauty and self-preservation; Orwell wanted to be of use to people who
were suffering.  They all succeeded.  Each of them was brilliantly, equally, successful"
(Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 170). I believe that Rorty and Dewey agree that
critical theory too often leads critics to try to classify all art in the same sorts of
categories, rather than recognizing how different the goals of artists can be.  In his own
essays on criticism, Burroughs concurs with Rorty and Dewey, saying “Certainly no one
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can be justly condemned for not doing what he does not intend to do” (The Adding
Machine 192).  Focusing on the end results does not mean that we are searching for the
single, true, and only legitimate end to every experience.  On the contrary, the richer the
work, the greater the number of possible end results: "the value of experience is not only
in the ideals it reveals, but in its power to disclose many ideals, a power more germinal
and significant than any revealed ideal, since it includes them in its stride, shatters and
remakes them" (Dewey 322).  Good critical theory allows and encourages critics to help
discover as many of these possible ideals as we are able.
The second way in which our critical narratives can be useful is to work so that
others have richer experiences of art.  "The function of criticism is the reeducation of
perception of works of art," Dewey tells us, reminding us that our primary goal should be
to serve as guides along the path of  experience.  We cannot and should not try to
experience art for others, giving them only a summary of details, nor should we substitute
our own work in place of the artist's by intruding prejudiced theories upon our readers.
Instead, we ought to highlight the qualities that make each artist unique, constructing
narratives which will allow others to experience those qualities without the intrusion of
arbitrary judgment.
Sadly, some critics have relished their power to proclaim an artist’s work as
“immoral” or “trash”, either because they failed to understand the vision the artist was
trying to present or because it offended their sensibilities.  We could easily present a long
list of works now acknowledged as classics that were censored because they violated
contemporary standards of morality. Dewey believes that art should expect resistance
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from those who uphold the status quo, “because art is wholly innocent of ideas derived
from praise and blame, it is looked upon with the eye of suspicion by the guardians of
custom” (Art as Experience 349).  We critics ought to take care, therefore, that we not
allow ourselves to become such reactionary guardians by allowing art at least the
possibility of challenging and perhaps even changing our own final vocabularies.  In
other words, we need to be ironists, searching for new modes of expression.  Pragmatism
suggests that art, however controversial, is far more valuable to society than those who
would stifle it, and that truly revolutionary art probably will have to go through a period
of rejection before the vision it presents can be understood by intellectuals and the public:
“Hence it is that art is more moral than moralities.  For the latter either are, or tend to
become, consecrations of the status quo, reflections of custom, reinforcements of the
established order” (Art as Experience 368).  The more a work of art transcends and
transforms cultural assumptions, the greater its actual value to the society it challenges.
 Using an ironist mindset, critics can help artists transform society by helping
others apprehend the impact of art.  Rorty believes that "the critic is now expected to
facilitate moral reflection by suggesting revisions in the canon of moral exemplars and
advisors" (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 82).  By calling our attention to ignored
artists, the critic assists in both personal reflection and public discourse, helping us see
ways in which we may wish to revise our sense of what we want to be like, individually
or collectively.
Rorty's favorite tool for assessing the utility of various vocabularies is
redescription, which means taking a vocabulary and putting it in your own terms, taking
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someone else's description and casting it in a different perspective. If we are to be ironist-
critics ourselves, we should become familiar with the reasons Rorty has for preferring
redescription over analytic argumentation:  "The ironist thinks of logic as ancillary to
dialectic" (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 78).  Rorty finds argument limiting; it
represents many of the assumptions and practices of the current trends in intellectual
discourse that Rorty wants to replace.
Argument requires premises and foundations, and it tends to presuppose that there
is one right answer to any given question. If we use two or more vocabularies at the same
time in our redescription, we are engaged in dialectic:  "the attempt to play off
vocabularies against one another" (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 78).
Argumentation is the philosophical mode of discourse, based on the mirror model of
thought, while dialectic functions as the literary mode of discourse:  "The ironist's
preferred form of argument is dialectical in the sense that she takes the unit of persuasion
to be a vocabulary rather than a proposition.  Her method is redescription rather than
inference" (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 78). We can see redescription throughout
Rorty's books and articles, where he gives a vast array of prominent thinkers what he
calls (borrowing from Bloom) "a strong misreading."  This means making their thoughts
serve as a departure point for his own, discovering advantages and weaknesses in their
perspectives and your own simultaneously.  If we were to look at a writer as an ironist,
we should be able to see her in a constant search for additions to her final vocabulary,
playing various descriptions off of each other:"take the writings of all the people with
poetic gifts, all the original minds who had a talent for redescription . . . as grist to be put
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through the same dialectical mill" (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 76).  This interplay
of perspectives is dialectical in the Hegelian sense; after using one vocabulary as a thesis
and another as antithesis, one should then arrive at a change in one's own final
vocabulary that serves as synthesis.  Furthermore, if one is a writer, the obtained
synthesis could be utilized  in turn by others who want to adopt this new vocabulary:
"Ironists specialize in redescribing ranges of objects or events in partially neologistic
jargon, in hope of inciting people to adopt and extend that jargon" (Contingency, Irony,
and Solidarity 78).  Authors who are able to present their own, idiosyncratic final
vocabularies in ways that suit the needs of their times or appear especially exciting to
particular kinds of people influence how their readers think and speak and edify their
audience.
Now we may turn our attention to the ways in which Richard Rorty and William
Burroughs share an interest in literary edification.  These two writers may rightly be
called iconoclasts–both of them enjoy smashing the idols of assumptions and
expectations in their respective fields.  Rorty steadfastly refuses to justify his preference
for liberal human values, a strange reluctance on the part of a philosopher.  Literary
criticsii have long found William Burroughs’ novels equally confusing, often labeling
them as either obscene or sheer nonsense.
Both writers’ peculiarities stem from their own convictions rather than mere
whim or the desire to be eccentric.  They have interesting points to make, and they have
found the limits imposed by dogmatic rules of their trades to be confining when they
attempt to express their ideas, and so have gone beyond the boundaries of what was
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previously assumed to be “natural” to their work.
Each can shed light on the other.  Using Rorty’s ideas about the power of
literature to expand our moral horizons, we can better understand what Burroughs has
achieved: the novel pushed beyond its breaking point.  Burroughs’ books are designed for
dialectic, that pragmatic play of vocabularies, and he edifies the reader about the process
of consciously building and revising final vocabularies.  Burroughs sacrifices everything
for his dialectic, literary elements other writers cannot do without, like plot continuity,
stable characters, narrative exposition.  He puts out a block of text which illustrates one
point of view only to shift, without warning, into another radically different viewpoint,
showing us how one sounds when juxtaposed with the other. Burroughs puts his
pragmatic outlook into his writing, and in doing so has helped spread pragmatic thinking,
although the term has rarely been applied to him.  Allen Ginsberg described him as “one
of the immortals; he’s had an enormous effect on succeeding generations of writers
directly, and indirectly through my work and Kerouac’s work in terms of his ideas, his
ideologies, his Yankee pragmatic spiritual investigations” (Ginsberg qtd. in Burroughs
and Bockris 19).  As a technical innovator, Burroughs has influenced both general
readers and other artists, notably David Bowie, Kathy Acker, and The Talking Heads.
His pragmatism covers virtually all of Rorty’s major themes, including contingency of
self: “Human nature is another figment of the imagination” (From the Bunker 10);
contingency of language: “All generalities are meaningless.  You’ve got to pin it down to
a specific person doing a specific thing at a specific time and space” (From the Bunker
10); and contingency of culture: “The past is largely a fabrication by the living.  And
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history is simply a bundle of fabrications” (From the Bunker 18).  Burroughs’ emphasis
on the primacy of experience of all kinds, internal and external, and the importance of
investigating the end-results of ideas is similar to the views of James and Dewey.
Even William Burroughs’ rhetorical style sounds distinctly pragmatic:
“definitions are usually not necessary and frequently confusing.  We do not need to
define electricity to arrive at any formulation as to what electricity essentially is, to know
how electricity operates and to use it effectively.  I don’t have to define something in
order to use it or describe its properties” (The Adding Machine 93).  Burroughs frequently
eschews definitions and applies this kind of cash-value thinking in his works, asking
about consequences and outcomes rather than first principles and general formulations.
His pragmatism has a strong linguistic component, like Rorty’s, and Burroughs is wary of
terms like “Truth” that are highly dependent upon one’s own contingent final vocabulary:
“Take an abstract word like ‘truth.’  You can’t see it, you can’t touch it.  Everyone who
uses the word has a different definition.  Some are referring to religious truth, others to
scientific truth, magical truth, pragmatic truth, some to a private lunacy.  Everyone is
talking at cross purposes” (The Adding Machine 101).  Rather than worrying over
definitions of ambiguous terms, Burroughs prefers to develop specific, context-sensitive
solutions to problems.  In the second chapter, I will discuss the techniques Burroughs
uses to put into practice this pragmatic philosophy.
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i I bring this issue of moral judgment to the reader’s attention not only because Dewey explains the kind of
criticism I want to avoid, but also because negative criticisms of Burroughs’ reputed “immorality” have
formed the bulk of critical (and legal) objections against him in the past.  See Jennie Skerl’s and Robin
Lydenberg’s excellent collection of examples in William Burroughs at the Front:  Critical Reception 1959-
1989.  Among the best representatives of early morality-based opinions of Burroughs can be found in the
Times Literary Supplement review entitled simply “Ugh…” and the letters it inspired.
ii For other examples of critical confusion, again consult Skerl and Lydenberg’s collection, particularly the
article by David Lodge, “Objections to William Burroughs.”
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CHAPTER 2
WILLIAM BURROUGHS AS PRAGMATIC WRITER AND THINKER
I use Rorty and Dewey in the first chapter to synthesize a pragmatic approach to
literature, for Rorty's part focusing on ironist thinking, redescription, final vocabularies,
and dialectic. I also extract some of Dewey's more specific methods for approaching and
understanding art, such as analysis/synthesis techniques and the desirability of using
criticism to increase the public’s understanding of art, rather than judging it according to
past standards. I begin my examination of the work of William Burroughs with an
analysis of his methods, techniques and ideas which bear a distinctly pragmatic stamp. I
analyze four pragmatic techniques:  cut-ups, routines, literalization of metaphor,  and
vocabulary shift.
It is especially important to focus on Burroughs’ techniques, as these have been
widely misunderstood by critics and much of the general public, which mistake in turn
has led to misapplied accusations of obscenity, immorality, and artlessness in his works.
In later chapters, I will show more of the goals of his writing which will lead us to an
understanding of the bigger picture, or synthesis, of his work as a pragmatic, ironist, and
liberal thinker. I ask the reader’s forbearance if this arrangement seems rather arbitrary,
for it is. When dealing with a writer like Burroughs, who numbers among his goals the
desire to move beyond hierarchical thinking, it is difficult not to write (as he does) in a
somewhat circular, episodic fashion. So, rather than thinking of this text as an
argumentative structure which relies on a specific order, I ask that you consider it more in
the Rortyean fashion as a narrative which tries to describe the works of Rorty, Dewey,
29
and Burroughs in such a way as to help us understand them better.  Let us now examine
the techniques which have helped make William Burroughs such an original and
controversial artist.
The cut-up or fold-in technique is probably Burroughs’ most distinctive one,
although he credits his close friend and collaborator , the painter Brion Gysin,  with the
original discovery. Gysin, who in the 30’s had been connected to the Dadaist movement
in Paris, had already been using collage techniques in his paintings for many years when
he accidentally discovered a way to do a collage with words. While slicing up pictures
and using a newspaper underneath to protect his table from the knife, Gysin discovered
that the sliced-up newspaper lines could be combined to form new texts. He immediately
realized that this opened up new techniques for writers, based on what was already
common practice among graphic artists. Saying that writing is fifty years behind painting,
he shared this discovery with Burroughs, who began in characteristic style to
intentionally  investigate its possibilities. Burroughs hoped that “the extension of cut-up
techniques will lead to more precise verbal experiments closing this gap and [give] a
whole new dimension to writing” (The Job 27).
Burroughs immediately put this new experiment to use, publishing the cut-up
collaboration Minutes to Go in 1960, and continuing to utilize cut-ups extensively in his
Nova Trilogy (The Soft Machine, The Ticket That Exploded, Nova Express), and in The
Wild Boys, Port of Saints, and Exterminator!. Burroughs investigated the use of cut-ups
in other media as well, beginning with tape recorder experiments in collaboration with
close companion Ian Somerville in the early and mid-1960's:
30
There are all sorts of things you can do on a tape recorder that cannot
possibly be indicated on a printed page. The concept of simultaneity
cannot be indicated on a printed page, except very crudely through the use
of columns and even so the reader must follow one column down. We’re
used to reading from left to right and then back, and this conditioning is
not easy to break down. (The Job 29)
The tape-recorder collaborations helped Burroughs develop his ideas about verbal
programming.  By recording passages and phrases; then re-recording back over them at
random places, he used tape recorders to show how cut-ups could work audibly as well as
visibly.  Just as mass printing could be used to program millions of readers, the
technology of mass broadcasting suggested to him ways in which audible cut-ups could
be used to influence crowds of people in real-life situations:  “go see some interesting
results when several hundred tape recorders turn up at a political rally or a freedom
march suppose you record the ugliest snarling southern law men several hundred tape
recorders spitting it back and forth and chewing it around like a cow with the aftosa you
now have a sound that could make any neighborhood unattractive” (The Ticket That
Exploded 209-210).  These tape experiments helped Burroughs develop his
understanding of the relationship between language and technology, and for the rest of
his career this understanding is presented in his novels and interviews.
In the mid-60's Burroughs worked on film projects with Anthony Balch, a British
filmmaker who was interested in applying the cut-up technique to cinema (Gentleman
Junky 115). Out of this collaboration came several short films, The Cut-Ups, Bill & Tony,
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and Towers Open Fire, the last of which can be seen in excerpts in the commercially
available Commissioner of Sewers (Mystic Fire Video). The impact of these multi-media
works can be seen in all of Burroughs’ subsequent books, in which he describes various
possible uses for tape recorders and films for both controlling an unwitting populace or
for freeing oneself from word and image conditioning.  These same tools of Control (all
those forces which seek to reduce human independence), i.e. tapes and films, when used
correctly to subvert Control’s commands become weapons  which can destroy Control
systems and their agents (government, police, or any representative of a controlling
authority).  Metaphorically, the linear progression of film and its ability to captivate the
imaginations of viewers becomes the Reality Film.  This film has been pre-recorded so
that those endings desired by Control will come to pass.  Only by destroying the scripts
and disrupting the Reality Film can those freedom partisans that Burroughs champions
hope to prevent Nova (the destruction of Earth via nuclear holocaust).  Burroughs uses
this metaphor throughout the rest of his writing, showing the reader many techniques for
disrupting Control’s Reality Film, and gives readers examples of his characters
succeeding in such disruptions:
Kim shoots a hole in the sky.  Blackness pours out and darkens the
earth.  In the last rays of a painted sun, a Johnson holds up a barbed-wire
fence for others to slip through.  The fence has snagged the skyline. . . a
great black rent.  Screaming crowds point to the torn sky.
“OFF THE TRACK!  OFF THE TRACK!”
“FIX IT!” the director bellows. . . .
32
“What with, a Band-Aid and chewing gum?  Rip in the Master
Film. . . .Fix it yourself, Boss Man.”
“ABANDON SHIP, GOD DAMN IT. . . .EVERY MAN FOR
HIMSELF!”
Kim, one of Burroughs’ fictional alter-egos, is showing everyone the constructed nature
of our reality, much to the horror of the Director, a  master-manipulator who uses
technology and language to convince us all that the official “reality” of Control is all that
there is or ever could be. Reality is the con game and we (ordinary people) are the marks.
Once someone like Kim succeeds in disrupting the Reality Film (a process Burroughs has
also called “wising up the marks”), it becomes almost impossible for Control to re-assert
authority, for Control’s hold depends upon our passive acquiescence.
 By the late 1970’s Burroughs relaxed his focus on this cut-up technique
(although he never abandoned it) and made a shift back towards more standard narratives.
He felt he had learned a great deal from his cut-up period, but seem realized that he had
depended a bit too heavily on it in some of his works:"I would go so far with any given
experiment and then come back; that is, I am coming back now to write purely
conventional straightforward narrative. But applying what I have learned from the cut-up
and the other techniques to the problem of conventional writing" (The Job 55). This
application of cut-up technique is evident in his second trilogy (Cities of the Red Night,
The Place of Dead Roads, The Western Lands).  Jennie Skerl points out that Burroughs’
return to narrative “does not mean a return to conventional forms of fiction, however.
His works remain fragmentary in structure because he wishes to explore the power to
33
create stories rather than to tell particular stories” (92).  Although cut-ups occur less
frequently within the text, the narrative is cut into pieces and arranged in a non-linear
fashion.   For instance, The Place of Dead Roads begins with the death of the protagonist
Kim Carsons, then goes into the story of who Kim is (was) and what he does (did)i to
disrupt the Reality Film.  Like most of his works, these books are fragmentary because
their non-linear storylines are elusive and their endings are ambiguous, so that the trilogy
as a whole can be viewed as a cut-up. In these later works, narrative sections often read
like cut-ups, while cut-up sections blend smoothly with narrative.  For example, here is a
section of narrative which uses random elements to produce the juxtaposition-feeling of a
cut-up:
The evening start shines clear and green . . . “Fair as a start, when
only one / Is shining in the sky.”  That’s Wordsworth, Kim remembers.  It
is raining in the Jemez Mountains.
“It is raining, Anita Huffington.”  Last words of General Grant,
spoken to his nurse, circuits in his brain flickering out like lightning in
gray clouds.
Kim leaned back against stone still warm from the sun.  A cool
wind touched his face with the smell of rain.
Pottery shards . . . arrowheads . . . a crib . . . a rattle . . . a blue
spoon . . . a slingshot, the rubber rotted through. . . rusting fishhooks . . .
tools . . . you can see there was a cabin here once. . . (Place of Dead Roads
10-11)
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From earlier works like Nova Express we can see how Burroughs uses dashes and
ellipses to indicate the splice-marks in his cut-ups, rather like the cuts and splices in a
film.  Although the ellipses makes this excerpt look like a cut-up, it is actually a narrative
passage which uses the style of cut-ups to depict the free associations of Kim’s mind as
he rests and contemplates his surroundings.  In such later works as this, Burroughs found
ways to achieve the effects of cut-ups while actually using them only sparingly.This
brings us to some critical issues that must be dealt with. The cut-up technique has caused
more controversy about Burroughs amongst writers and critics than any other. When
Burroughs attended an international writers conference in Edinburgh in the 60's, he was
subject to virulent attack by some of the panelists, not so much because of  the so-called
"obscene" elements of his work, but for his extensive use of cut-ups.  One superficial
objection to Burroughs’ use of other people’s material is that it is tantamount to
plagiarismii. Many of the early literary reviewers of Burroughs have found no value in
cut-ups whatsoever. Such people generally claim that his cut-ups are just a gimmick and
have no literary value: "But how authentic is the "cut-up method," and how unique are its
effects? ‘You can cut the truth out of any written or spoken words,’ Burroughs claims.
The fact remains that in the first part of this work, which is by far the most effective, the
cut-up method is used cannily and sparingly" (Hassan 57-58); "The cut-up method, by
which the writer selects from random collocations of ready-made units of discourse,
seems a lazy shortcut, a way of evading the difficult and demanding task of reducing to
order the personally felt experience of disorder" (McCluhan 82). These reactions  should
not be surprising; Burroughs himself sees cut-ups as a challenge to much of the
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traditional theory and practice of literature. For him, the outcry over cutups is primarily
an issue of control over language and thought:
The word of course is one of the most powerful instruments of
control as exercised by the newspaper and images as well, there are
both words and images in newspapers. . . . Now if you start cutting
these up and rearranging them you are breaking down the control
system. Fear and prejudice are always dictated by the control
system just as the church built up prejudice against heretics . . . .
This is something that  threatens the position of the establishment,
of any establishment, and therefore they will oppose it, will
condition people to fear and reject or ridicule it. (The Job 33-34)
In his own iconoclastic way, Burroughs took the vitriolic opposition to cut-ups in the
same vein as the obscenity charges against Naked Lunch; he assumed he was doing
something right.  His desire was to break down conditioned responses, to thwart common
expectations of what a novel could be, and the responses he received suggested that he
succeeded.  But there are also more specific answers to the charges of his critics.
One response to the idea that cut-ups are a type of plagiarism is to reveal the
ridiculousness of its premise: that people can "own" words. In The Adding Machine essay
"Les Voleurs," Burroughs describes how he first reacted upon seeing Brion Gysin's
casual use of other writer's words:
I was, I confess, slightly shocked by such overt and traceable
plagiarism.  I had not quite abandoned the fetish of originality,
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though of course the whole sublime concept of total theft is
implicit in cut-ups and montage.  You see, I had been conditioned
to the idea of words as property one's "very own words" and
consequently to a deep repugnance for the black sin of plagiarism.
(The Adding Machine 20)
Burroughs comes to realize that words are the building material of the writer, and they
belong to anyone who can use them (The Adding Machine 21) in the expression of an
imaginative vision.  The idea of word ownership comes with all kinds of corporate,
capitalist, egotistical assumptions that Burroughs wants no part of.
A second response to the charge of plagiarism is to think in Rortyean terms of
vocabularies rather than just words. Burroughs is appropriating other texts as means to
his end, the dialectic presentation of his ideas. Just as a philosopher might use pieces of
Plato or Dewey while constructing an original argument, Burroughs uses other people’s
vocabularies as raw material for his dialectic, playing them off against each other and
against his own ideas. He does not claim these appropriated parts to be his own; on the
contrary, he identifies most of his sources, even the ones that only appear as pieces in cut-
ups. But he does claim, rightly, that the resulting work as a whole is his own. Burroughs
views all texts as open to appropriation, including his own.
The second criticism against cut-ups, that they have no value, can be handled
expediently  by showing  seven specific ways I have found by which Burroughs uses
them in his works. Because he does have such a pragmatic frame of mind, Burroughs
often describes in essays and interviews his intended uses for cut-ups, and by reading cut-
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ups closely in the context in which they appear, we can see how they affect one's reading
experience in profound and original ways.
The first use for cut-ups is to generate new ideas and directions for the writer:
I follow the channels opened by the rearrangement of the text.  This is the
most important function of the cut-up.  I may take a page, cut it up, and
get a whole new idea for straight narrative, and not use any of the cut-up
material at all, or I may use a sentence or two out of the actual cut-up.
(The Job 29)
By using and combining his texts with outside sources, Burroughs found he could come
up with all sorts of phrases, sentences, and ideas for his writing.  The randomness of cut-
ups is sometimes decried, but this very randomness produces unexpectedly fruitful
results.  Furthermore, this process isn’t fully random, as Burroughs himself notes:  “Well
you control what you put into your montages; you don’t fully control what comes out.
That is, I select a page to cut up and I have control over what I put in.  I simply fit what
comes out of the cut-ups back into a narrative structure” (The Job 30).  The second
chapter of Cities of the Red Night serves as an example of the two preceding quotations
concerning the generative power of cut-ups as well as Burroughs’ conscious, controlled
skill in weaving the results into the flow of his novels.  In this chapter, a young Chinese
army officer discovers a Tibetan village/monastery that has been infected with a
genetically modified plague by the CIA.  The title of the chapter, “We See Tibet With the
Binoculars of the People”, came from  cut-up work of the early 70’s.  Burroughs suggests
in The Adding Machine that this same phrase appears in a book of tape experiments by
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Konstantin Raudive.  In any case, Burroughs took this odd little phrase and constructed a
self-contained narrative chapter in which someone using “the binoculars of the people”
(as Chinese army equipment might be correctly called) looks upon a scene in Tibet. “We
See Tibet” includes some of his favorite topics, including viral infection and government
experimentation upon an unsuspecting populace, which blend quite smoothly with
themes of virus mutation and battles between Manichean forces that are found all
throughout Cities.
I find this technique to be pragmatic because of its focus on the cash-value of
what is produced.  In his descriptions of the technique, Burroughs reminds us that there is
a great deal of work involved, work which requires an open imagination and a discerning
eye, for one may cut up dozens of pages of texts while searching for that one line or
passage which will be useful to the work; “some of them are useful from a literary point
of view and some are not” (The Job 28).  This technique encourages the writer to listen
for new vocabularies, new modes of imaginative expression, as Rorty and Dewey would
put it, and to use them, whatever their source might have been. Furthermore, there is no
contention that cut-ups are some sort of guaranteed technique for producing revolutionary
works.  Burroughs never claims that the cut-up will work for everyone; repeatedly he
reminds us that “there are many technologies of writing and a technique that is useful for
one writer may be of no use to another.  There is no one way to write” (The Adding
Machine 32).  The success or failure of cut-ups as a writing technique, then, depends on
the skills of the writer and how effectively cut-ups are employed, as with any other
method.
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A second use for cut-ups is to remove the power which certain words and phrases
have over us.  Burroughs calls these associations "word lines," believing that much of the
effectiveness of advertising and propaganda comes from the word lines they create and
stimulate in our minds.  In virtually all of Burroughs’ novels we hear the refrain, “Cut
Word Lines.”  Part of Burroughs’ thinking here comes from Count Alfred Korzybski,
while part of it comes from Scientology.  Burroughs read Korzybski and attended some
of his lectures in Chicago in the late 1930’s, and from him gained ideas about the
arbitrary relationship between a word and the object to which the word refers as well as
the limiting nature of Aristotelian either / or thinking (Morgan 72). From L. Ron
Hubbard’s Scientology Burroughs took the idea that words can be linked with memories
and stored in the subconscious, subtly influencing thoughts and behaviors (Miles 172).
The idea of “Word Lines” is that through repetition and other techniques conducive to
mass media, we come to associate clusters of concepts and emotions with certain words.
When we hear these words, they trigger automatic responses in us, responses which are to
the advantage of Control in some way.  For example, Americans during the 50’s and 60’s
were programmed to respond to the word "Communist," even though the word itself was
so often invoked in so many different contexts that long ago it ceased to have any
recognizable meaning.  Now when those in Control desire to label someone derisively, all
they need do is invoke the dreaded term, and no one will stop to think whether the label
actually applies before the effect has already been produced.  Burroughs wants to break
down these lines of association, and cut-ups are his primary method for doing so.
The section from The Ticket That Exploded entitled “do you love me?” works to
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break down word lines built around sex and romantic love. Burroughs often describes
sexuality as “The Garden of Earthly Delights,” or “The Orgasm Death Trap,” because he
believed sex and love were powerful  Control mechanisms.   Heterosexuality in
particular, with its binary male/female system, is one of many tools used to create
conflicts between human beings. The title itself is indicative of these themes of Control,
with its interrogative insistence and its susceptibility to binary opposition between “you”
and “me,” an opposition Burroughs plays with in many other places.  The section opens
with little narrative fanfare, proceeding directly to the subject at hand:  “The young monk
led Bradley to a cubicle—On a stone table was a tape recorder—The monk switched on
the recorder and sounds of lovemaking filled the room—The monk took off his robe and
stood naked with an erection” (The Ticket That Exploded 43).  This short opening sets the
tone for the rest of this cut-up chapter, showing how our conceptions of romantic love
and physical gratification tie us up with  sexual strings that can be pulled at will , turning
us into puppets.  The young monk cannot control his libido; his body betrays his
helplessness.  Furthermore, his lust is excited by verbal cues coming out of a machine,
rather than an actual partner, so word and sound associations trigger the response, not
human to human interaction.  Burroughs is emphasizing the automatic, involuntary nature
of sexuality, showing the ways in which it controls us much more than we control it.  As
this little introductory scene concludes, the young monk is completely controlled by the
sounds of the tape recorder, and the word associations play him like a puppet, forcing
him into “a parody of lovemaking as the tape recorder speeded up” (The Ticket That
Exploded 43).  The cut-up section then rubs in the physicality of our sexuality by
41
juxtaposing it with sickly-sweet lines from various pop tunes:  “All the tunes and sound
effects of ‘Love’ spit from the recorder permutating sex whine of a sick picture planet:
Do you love me?—But I exploded in cosmic laughter—Old acquaintance be forgot?—Oh
darling, just a photograph?—Mary I love you, I do do you know i love you through?”
(The Ticket That Exploded 43-44).
This cut-up forces us to reevaluate our thoughts about love and sex, as every
hackneyed, worn-out cliché of romantic love is run through the cut-up mill.  Shocking
sexual slang is juxtaposed with the most saccharine love song lyrics, revealing the
ludicrousness of both these subjects and our mixed-up, pre-programmed notions of them.
Burroughs wants to lead us out of the “Garden of Earthly Delights”, the “Orgasm Death
Trap,” and into a more free state of mind.
Not every cut-up section can be so easily placed according to theme; many cut-
ups are amalgamations of several of William Burroughs’ favorite themes.  Plus, any
given cut-up, including “do you love me?”, contains random factors that have been cut
into it; that’s part of the process.  As we read the cut-ups, we are confronted by our own
idiosyncratic word lines, some familiar, others not.  By going through them, the reader
displaces the pre-programmed associations by a combination of juxtaposition of disparate
elements, random unplanned elements, and radical dichotomies, such as “Remember
every little thing you used to do—I’ve forgotten you then?” (The Ticket That Exploded
48-49).
All this cut-up work is designed to reduce either/or thinking and reliance on
linear, programmed thought.  By disrupting the common patterns of media, everyday
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speech, and inner dialogue, William Burroughs hopes to cut the word lines in himself and
his readers.  Thus, in order for his work to have maximum impact, the ideal Burroughs
reader would not just absorb cut-up texts, but would also create them.  Just as Burroughs
has certain themes (sex, drug addiction, control) that he explores, an intrepid, interactive
reader could discover unique issues and idiosyncratic themes by following Burroughs’
example.  Such a reader would write his own texts, then cut them up along with those
authors (Burroughs perhaps among them) whose vocabularies he finds worthy of
investigation and appropriation.
A third and closely related purpose for cut-ups is to reveal the hidden agendas and
potentials of certain vocabularies.  Burroughs himself believed that cut-ups could reveal
the future, and this led him to an idea crucial to understanding his work, the idea that
writing can create (or re-create) the future.
I would say that my most interesting experience with the earlier
techniques was the realization that when you make cut-ups you do not get
simply random juxtapositions of words, that they do mean something, and
often that these meanings refer to some future event.  I’ve made many cut-
ups and then later recognized that the cut-up referred to something that I
read later in a newspaper or in a book, or something that happened.  To
give a very simple example, I made a cut-up of something Mr. Getty had
written, I believe for Time and Tide.  The following phrase emerged:  “It’s
a bad thing to sue your own father.”  About three years later his son sued
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him.  Perhaps events are pre-written and pre-recorded and then you cut
word lines the future leaks out. (The Job 28)
If we take Burroughs literally, this might sound ridiculous at first, or he may sound like
one who believes in predestined fate.  I think that he had realized a way to discover
hidden meanings in certain vocabularies, to redescribe them in such a way that previously
unknown potentials became obvious.  If we think of our many vocabularies as tools for
both describing and interacting with the world, and we believe his theory that most of our
current vocabularies are created and reinforced by our controllers in order to conceal their
true agenda, then Burroughs begins to sound like common sense.  It then seems only
natural that governments and multi-national corporate vocabularies would be arranged in
such a way as to allay our suspicions and lull us into complacency, for in doing so they
make us all the more tractable to their ends.  But when these carefully crafted
vocabularies are cut-up, some of their potential meanings and future possibilities may be
revealed.  Take, for example, a superb cut-up from Nova Express, in which Burroughs
shows us the hidden agenda of drug law repression:
PLAN DRUG ADDICTION
Now you are asking me whether I want to perpetuate a narcotics
problem and I say:  “Protect the disease.  Must be made criminal
protecting society from the disease.”
The problem scheduled in the United States the use of jail, former
narcotics plan, addiction and crime for many years—Broad front “Care”
of welfare agencies—Narcotics which antedate the use of drugs—The fact
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is noteworthy—48 stages—prisoner was delayed—has been separated—
was required—
Addiction in some form is the basis—must be wholly addicts—Any
voluntary capacity subversion of The Will Capital And Treasury Bank—
Infection dedicated to traffic in exchange narcotics demonstrated a
Typhoid Mary who will spread narcotics problem to the United
Kingdom—Finally in view of the cure—cure of the social problem and as
such dangerous to society—
Maintaining addict cancers to our profit—pernicious personal
contact—Market increase—Release The Prosecutor to try any holes—Cut
Up Fighting Drug Addiction by Malcolm Monroe Former Prosecutor, in
Western World, October 1959. (52)
This former drug crusader Monroe, who in the original text espoused the typical
governmental line about the pernicious dangers of drug addicts, now admits (in this cut-
up) how those in authority “PLAN DRUG ADDICTION” so as to insure their own jobs.
They “protect the disease” of drug addiction because it affords them so many
opportunities for scapegoating certain citizens while scaring all the others into obedience.
The police get massive budget increases, while the government obtains income from drug
forfeitures.  That their official policy of preventing all drug use is futile is revealed by the
admission of the “Narcotics which antedate drug use,” for indeed alteration of
consciousness through drugs has been a part of human culture since the earliest written
records of the Sumerians, who composed poems in praise of beer.  The idea that
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governments now can eliminate all drug use is either absurdly arrogant or blatantly false.
The vocabulary of control, cut-up and rearranged, becomes an admission of guilt.
Regardless of whether or not we take Burroughs literally when he talks about cut-ups
revealing the future, we can see the cut-up technique as a powerful redescriptive tool
which is capable of delineating the potentials of any given vocabulary.
My fourth point about cut-ups is that they help break up the logical conditioning
associated with linear narrative.  They do so by repeating themes, images, and phrases in
a poetic montage, making us aware of how we impose order and meaning upon texts,
rather than the texts supplying meaning to us.    Here are two excerpts from The Soft
Machine; the first a cut-up from “Last Hints,” the second a part of a narrative from
“Where the Awning Flaps”:
On a sea wall met a boy under the circling albatross—Peeled his red-and-
white T-shirt to brown flesh and grey under like ash and passed a joint
back and forth as we dropped each other’s pants and he looked down face
like Mayan limestone in the Kerosene lamp sputter of burning insect
wings over the tide flats—Woke up in other flesh the lookout different—
hospital smell of backward countries—(119)
On the sea wall met the guide under the Circling Albatross.  Peeled his
red- and  white-striped T-shirt to brown flesh and grey under like ash and
we passed a joint back and forth as we dropped each other’s pants and he
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looked down face like Mayan limestone in a Kerosene lamp sputter of
burning insect wings. (122)
The first passage has the textual markers of a cut-up:  dashes connect words and phrases,
but there is no other punctuation.  It also has the disjunctive flow of cut-ups when read,
and the odd juxtapositions of images.  The narrative voice wakes up “in other flesh,”
meaning a transfer of consciousness to a new physical body, another common sign of the
cut-up.  The second passage has much the same information but in a flowing narrative
style with complete sentences.  “Circling Albatross” is now capitalized, making it sound
like a tavern or shop as opposed to an actual bird.  The T-shirt has gone from “red-and-
white” to “red- and white-striped.”  These small changes illustrate the montage effect of
cut-ups in the  Nova Trilogy, the most reflexive and self-referential of the cut-up novels.
One’s memory and interpretation of previously read passages is challenged and changed
as one finds subtly different versions of those passages.  Burroughs mimics everyday
experience in the textual experience of the cut-up novels through this varied repetition.  If
we see walk down the same street every day on our way to work, we will most likely see
the same images again and again, but there will always be some small changes.  We may
wonder if we are seeing actual changes, or if our memories are just a bit faulty.  In his
texts, Burroughs repeats passages and parts of passages, and they become fluid, like
memory, forcing us to read even more closely in order to try to impose order and
meaning on them.
The variations and repetitions of the cut-ups suggest echo effects, when one hears
but not always clearly, so one searches all the more diligently for some sort of pattern .
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This echo effect gives Burroughs’ works a non-linear unity and a sense of textual
“space”—the words and images seem to move and change, appear and reappear in a new
guise.  They offer no set meaning, only endless possible permutations and interpretations.
Like abstract and idiosyncratic poetry, cut-ups make us wonder about the relationship a
line of text to its neighboring lines, and we soon become aware of how strong our habit of
imposing meaning upon texts really is.  We start to sense the discomfort which arises
when we can’t assimilate one part of a text into our preferred interpretation, and we
appreciate how often we try to ignore or discount those discordant elements.  Diligent
readers of cut-ups begin to work on the assumption that each string of words within a pair
of dashes is itself a vocabulary, a unit of meaning.  This assumptive understanding leads
the readers into a familiarity with dialectic, the play of one vocabulary against others.
Thus, cut-ups are ironic in the Rortyean sense, for “the ironist’s preferred form of
argument is dialectical in the sense that she takes the unit of persuasion to be a
vocabulary rather than a proposition” (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 78).  As we
read cut-up novels, we are led to notice the conjunctions and intersections of vocabularies
as we see passages in both whole and cut-up forms.  As we read a phrase from an earlier
(or later) narrative section that has been cut into the chapter we are currently reading, we
get shades of meaning from that earlier passage blended into whatever meaning we may
be provisionally constructing.  For example, let us look at another excerpt from “Where
the Awning Flaps”:
Panama clung to our bodies from Las Palmas to David on camphor sweet
smell of cooking paregoric—Burned down the republic—The druggist no
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glot clom Fliday—Panama mirrors of 1910 under seal in any drugstore—
He threw in the towel morning light on cold coffee stale breakfast table—
little cat smile—pain and death smell of his sickness in the room with
me—three souvenir shorts of Panama City—Old friend came and stayed
all day face eaten by “I need more”—I have noticed this in the New
World— (The Soft Machine 123)
In its context as part of a cut-up section, this passage reads like a free verse poem, full of
images prosaic and bizarre.  Each little phrase within a pair of dashes may be read as a
unit of meaning, but the excerpt also has suggestive power as whole.  The recurring
theme of drug addiction, for instance, gains prominence as one reads the whole section,
but this interpretation does not prevent one from having small, unrelated images
juxtaposing themselves with the addiction images.  Random elements in cut-ups, like the
“little cat smile” above, can be fit into the drug theme, but not in a final or seamless way.
When reading sections like this, we see how there are always multiple meanings flashing
in our heads, but we nonetheless want to narrow down these possibilities to try to
construct a coherent narrative.  The best cut-up sections, such as the one above, make us
aware of these tendencies while still slightly resisting them.  Total coherence is always a
bit beyond our reach.
For those well-versed in other parts of the Burroughs canon, cut-ups also
stimulate the “echo” effect when he cuts in bits and pieces from previous works.
Compare the preceding excerpt from The Soft Machine with this Burroughs letter from
1953:
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Bill Gains was in town and he has burned downiii the Republic of Panama
from Las Palmas to David on paregoric.  Before Gains, Panama was a p.g.
town.  You could buy four ounces in any drug store.  Now the druggists
are balky and the Chamber of Deputies was about to pass a special Gains
Law when he threw in the towel and went back to Mexico.  I was getting
off junk and he kept nagging me why was I kidding myself, once a junky
always a junky. . . and looking at me with his little cat smile. (Word Virus
96)
This letter from Panama, a narrative of paregoric, addiction, outrageous behavior, and
memories of Billy Bradshinkel, Burroughs’ high school prom date, is cut into “Where the
Awning Flaps”, a cut-up of homoerotica, Panama scenes, paregoric, and the beach, where
the awnings flap in the sea breeze.  The alienation and bitterness in William Burroughs’
letters from his voyage in search of the “telepathic” drug Yage echo in the cut-up, adding
associational depth to the section.  We can feel the emotional resonance through the cut-
ups of older material, even though we may not always be able to remember the source.
The fifth way Burroughs uses cut-ups is as  connectors of narrative segments.
The cut-up section “Naborhood in Aqualungs” shows how Burroughs, a writer who
generally eschews continuity and linear plot structures in his novels, still manages to keep
some unity and coherence in these works.  Here he uses the cut-up piece to connect the
opening of the chapter, featuring Nova Criminals Limestone John and an anonymous
narrator, with the subsequent section “The Fish Poison Con”, a scam artist piece set in
middle America featuring The Sailor and Burroughs’ alter-ego Beat narrator getting their
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drug and sex kicks.  Here is a piece of The Carbonic Caper:
Recollect when I was traveling with Limestone John on The Carbonic
Caper—It worked like this:  He rents an amphitheater with marble walls
he is a stone painter you dig can create a frieze while you wait—So he
puts on a diving suit like an old Surrealist Lark and I am up on a high
pedestal pumping the air to him—Well, he starts painting on the limestone
walls with hydrochloric acid and jetting himself around with air blasts he
can cover the wall in ten seconds, carbon dioxide settling down on the
marks begin to cough and loosen their collars. (Nova Express 3)
 This is classic Nova Conspiracy material, featuring the street hustler lingo of Burroughs’
Times Square days and the bizarre storyline of a routine.  The next excerpt is a section
from the Fish Poison Con, a more autobiographical routine filled with observations on the
ugliness of America:
I was traveling with Merit Inc. checking store attendants for larceny with a
crew of “shoppers”—There was two middle-aged cunts one owning this
Chihuahua which whimpered and yapped in a cocoon of black sweaters
and Bob Schafer Crew Leader who was an American Fascist with
Roosevelt jokes—It happens in Iowa this number comes over the radio:
“Old Sow Got Caught in the Fence Last Spring”—And Schafer said “Oh
my God, are we ever in Hicksville.” (The Soft Machine 23)
These two narratives are similar because of the con-artistry in their storylines and their
terminology.  But Burroughs manages to more closely tie the two together by inserting
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the cut-up collage “Naborhood in Aqualungs” in between them:
I was traveling with Merit John on The Carbonic Caper—Larceny with a
crew of shoppers—And this number comes over the air to him—So he
starts painting The D Fence last Spring—And shitting himself around with
air blasts in Hicksville—Stepped ten seconds and our carbon dioxide gave
out and we began to cough for such a purpose suffocating under a potted
palm in the lobby—
“Move on, you dig, clopping out ‘The Fish Poison Con.’”
“I got you—Keep it practical and they can’t—“ (The Soft Machine
19)
Although a montage of two different narratives, this resulting cut-up still reads with
surprising clarity, but as always with cut-ups, the reader has to participate actively and
imaginatively in the construction of meaning. “Naborhood in Aqualungs” mixes material
primarily from the two narrative sections it connects, sections which would otherwise
seem unrelated, the transition between them abrupt.  Poetically, these two pieces have
been unified by the cut-up, which blends together words and images from the narratives,
creating new images in the process.  Only by carefully reading and re-reading both
narrative sections can we fully appreciate the blends created in the cut-up.  Additionally,
readers will normally read them in order, with the cut-up in the middle, so when reading
the cut-up one notices mostly the familiar material from the Carbonic Caper, filtering out
the “Fish Poison Con” parts or incorporating them into a constructed narrative of the
reader’s own.  Only after reading “The Fish Poison Con” does the reader understand how
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the cut-up actually connects the other two sections.  The reader’s perception of “The Fish
Poison Con” will also be affected by the presence of material made already familiar by its
inclusion in the cut-up section, which has already been assimilated, forcing the reader to
reevaluate, only twenty-three pages into the novel, the whole experience of the chapter.
The sixth way Burroughs uses cut-ups is as a signal indicating a shift in the scene,
moving characters and/or the narrative perspective from one place and time to another.
These shifts have always tended to be abrupt even before cut-ups; such shifts are another
way in which Burroughs defies the usual linear progression of storytelling.  As he says in
his Atrophied Preface to Naked Lunch:
Why all this waste paper getting The People from one place to another?
Perhaps to spare The Reader stress of sudden space shifts and keep him
Gentle?  And so a ticket is bought, a taxi is called, a plane boarded. . . If
one of my people is seen in New York walking around in citizen clothes
and next sentence Timbuctu putting down lad talk on a gazelle-eyed
youth, we may assume that he (the party non-resident of Timbuctu)
transported himself there by the usual methods of communication . . .
(Word Virus 167)
Later, cut-ups will enhance this idea, since Burroughs sees cut-ups as a means of moving
the mind through space and time imaginatively, much like scene shifts in film.
Burroughs often applies ideas and techniques from filmmaking to his writing.  He
believes that when we are projecting our consciousness into cut-ups of texts and images
of other places or times, we are constructing alternative timelines which which we can
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interact.  For instance, “The Mayan Caper” in The Soft Machine is a how-to manual of
cut-up time travel.  The narrator begins with text cut-ups and fold-ins: “--Now when I
fold today’s paper in with yesterday’s paper and arrange the pictures to form a time
section montage, I am literally moving back to the time when I read yesterday’s paper,
that is traveling in time back to yesterday—“ (82).    By working with newspapers,
photos, novels, letters, magazines, and other printed media of a given era, the narrator
projects himself into the past.  Time is a fluid concept rather than a static one, and by
using the right tools we can imaginatively place ourselves in radically different contexts.
After the initial textual cut-ups, the narrator moves on; “The next step was carried
out in a film studio—I learned to talk and think backward on all levels—This was done
by running film and sound track backward—“ (The Soft Machine 82).  Using the kind of
multi-media approach from his experimental cut-up phase, Burroughs breaks down
further the restrictions of linear narrative, running the whole operation in reverse.
Burroughs also sometimes uses cut-ups to graphically represent the shift of perspective
from one place to another without the interpolation of a narrator (see for example The
Wild Boys 110),  with similar effect.  Near the end of this chapter, I will also explain how
Burroughs shifts the narrative perspective without using cut-ups.
The seventh use for cut-ups is to represent various internal experiences.  For
example, in “The Public Agent”, Burroughs shows, through the use of cut-ups, the
psychopathic, destructive, hate-filled mind of an Agent of Control.  The agent’s narrative
voice floats in and out of narrative scenes, in between which are cut-up segments which
display the mind of the agent:
54
So I am a public agent and the whole trough a light pink instruction from
street.  I winked at the commuters.  “Conversation I snap out of queers,” I
sniffed warningly.  “It’s a spot up on my back cases.”  Queers supporting
the floor like the three monkeys.  “Grope movies and Turkish our own,” I
said warmly and walked exempt narcotic.  Cool boys chase each other
with the first one of the day.  To a Turkish Bath and surprised you  bloody
nance.  Soapy towel glove hit him in the lungs and eyes spattered:  Ping!
And walked into the gabardine topcoats.  Five minutes  to that broken
fruit. (The Soft Machine 29)
Because the agent’s voice is the narrative voice, this interpolation of cut-up and narrative
is especially effective at drawing us into the mind of the sociopathic agent.  The
dissociative juxtapositions of these cut-ups, full of images by turn viciously violent and
mundane, work to expose us to the inner experiences of a disordered perspective.  We
experience the distorted, hateful thought  patterns, rather than simply having them
described to us.
Another good example of the use of cut-ups to present internal experience comes
early in The Soft Machine, in which Burroughs uses cut-ups to depict the bizarre
sensations of a drug addict’s withdrawal.  In the opening segment, “Dead on Arrival,”
Burroughs reworks material from his Word Hoard from the old New York Beat era,
featuring such familiar characters as The Sailor, Bill Gains, and Doctor Benway.  The
predominant theme of drug addiction and the cut-up technique are especially suited to
each other:
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Junky in east bath room. . . invisible and persistent dream body. . . familiar
face maybe. . . scored for some time or body. . . in that grey smell of rectal
mucus. . . night cafeterias and junky room dawn smells.  Three hours from
Lexington made it five times. . . soapy egg flesh. . .
“These double papers he claims of withdrawal.”
“Well I thought you was quitting. . . “
“I can’t make it.”
“Imposible quitar eso.”
Got up and fixed in the sick dawn flutes of Ramadan (The Soft
Machine 8)
Here Burroughs has also chosen to use ellipses, rather than the usual dashes, to join
together cut-up phrases.  The cut-ups here give a dreamlike quality, not unlike that of
opiate intoxication.  This is noticeably different from the previous cut-up, for we do not
experience violence, instead a jumbled stream of images and phrases.  The experience is
that of disorder and lack of focus, but not mental pathology.
As effective as the cut-ups are for depicting non-ordinary states of mind, the most
important point Burroughs makes through their use is that they can represent everyday
experience as well.  Our lives and our thoughts are not linear;  by editing and shaping our
experience they become linear.  We fool ourselves into ignoring the multitude of ways in
which we are influenced by commercial advertising in electronic and printed media, all of
which present images of how we should think and act as consumers.  This programming
by outside sources blends with all of our other experiences, such as what we see when we
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walk down the street or other daily routines, and we seldom take notice of how the story
of our lives is created.  Burroughs wants to draw our attention to both the effects of
outside influences and our own participation in the construction of our narratives.  By
using cut-ups he can move beyond linear narrative and take writing in new directions:
Writing is still confined in the sequential representational straitjacket of
the novel, a form as arbitrary as the sonnet and as far removed from the
actual facts of human perception and consciousness as that fifteenth-
century poetical form.  Consciousness is a cut-up; life is a cut-up.  Every
time you walk down the street or look out the window, your stream of
consciousness is cut by random factors.  (The Adding Machine 61)
These new directions will move people out of the limitations imposed by sequential
narrative, a limitation most never realize they work under.  To put it in Rorty’s terms,
Burroughs is offering new possibilities for self-creation narratives pointing out that all
narratives of self are created, even the ones that claim not to be.
Burroughs is not creating a dichotomy or a hierarchy; he uses both cut-ups and
straight narrative to make this point.  He is not arguing against narrative, but rather
showing us some assumptions we didn’t realize that we were making.  If we think our
stories are just out there, waiting to be discovered, we are missing the point.  We must
actively seek out the raw material for our narratives and put it together ourselves:  “You
will receive your instructions in many ways.  From books, street signs, films, in some
cases from agents who purport to be and may actually  be members of the organization.
There is no certainty.  Those who need certainty are of no interest to this department”
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(The Ticket That Exploded 10).  Those who cannot handle the contingency of self,
language, and culture are better off sticking with foundationalist narratives, which offer
definite premises and necessary conclusions.  Rorty believes that our culture as a whole
can move past foundationalism and into acceptance of contingency, but he often hedges
his bets by implying that intellectuals, the educated, and other special groups are more
disposed to his pragmatist system than  the general population, so intellectuals must take
the lead.  Burroughs says more explicitly that some people are ready and willing to make
this move, while others are either incapable or simply don’t want to leave the comfort and
security of stable belief systems.   For both Rorty and Burroughs, writers (and creative
people in general) are heroes, because they have the required vision, independence, and
bravery for self-creation.  The prospect that there is not and never will be any certainty
can be daunting, but Burroughs wants to describe a world of expanded horizons in such a
way as to make it desirable.
As a writer, Burroughs hopes to change the way his readers perceive themselves
and their world.  Cut-ups for him are a powerful tool which can be used to give readers
experiences beyond those contained in linear narrative.  Burroughs is interested in all
levels of experience, even those which are irrational or indescribable.  Rather than worry
about fitting his works into traditional form of the novel, with all its requirements of
sequence, plot, and continuity, he strives to present a different picture of human
experience; one which more accurately depicts the fragmented, disjointed way in which
the world makes impact upon all our senses, and this move away from easy, safe
continuity to complex, multi-layered chaos always entails risk and misunderstandings:
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When people speak of clarity in writing they generally mean plot,
continuity, beginning middle and end, adherence to a ‘logical’ sequence.
But things don’t happen in logical sequence and people don’t think in
logical sequence.  Any writer who hopes to approximate what actually
occurs in the mind and body of his characters cannot confine himself to
such an arbitrary structure as ‘logical’ sequence. Joyce was accused of
being unintelligible and he was presenting only one level of cerebral
events:  conscious sub-vocal speech.  I think it is possible to create
multilevel events and characters that a reader could comprehend with his
entire organic being. (The Job 35)
There is no getting around it: cut-up works like Port of Saints or The Wild Boys are
difficult to read and assimilate.  They present many challenges and require much of the
reader.  But that does not mean that we as students and teachers of literature should shy
away from works that incorporate the cut-up technique. Even without background
material as assistance, a diligent reader can carry away  distinct experiences after reading
Burroughs. Despite their resistance to conventional, argumentative, logical analysis, cut-
up works merit the kind of attention we give to other experimentalist authors such as
James Joyce, Gertrude Stein, and Djuna Barnes.  In saying this I join a growing number
of critics who have recognized and attempted to explicate Burroughs’ achievement.
Timothy Murphy, author of the most recent book-length critical work on Burroughs, says
[R]eaders who call the cut-ups simply destructive are irresponsible,
however, and their reactions often stem from misunderstanding of the
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technique, coupled with a refusal to learn how to read cut-up texts (and,
often, a refusal to look at the texts at all).  Once its fundamental strategies
are understood, the Nova trilogy is no more difficult to read than Gertrude
Stein’s Tender Buttons or Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, two “unreadable”
works which have experienced popular and scholarly revivals of interest in
recent years. (104)
Jennie Skerl sees cut-ups as a useful extension of Burroughs’ writing technique that
continues the experimentalism of Naked Lunch:
For Burroughs as an artist, the cutup is an impersonal method of
inspiration, invention, and an arrangement that redefines the work of art as
a process that occurs in collaboration with others and is not the sole
property of the artists.  Thus Burroughs’ cutup texts are comparable to
similar contemporary experiments in other arts, such as action painting,
happenings, and aleatory music.  His theory of the cutup also parallels
avant-garde literary theory, such as structuralism and deconstruction. (50)
These comparisons of Burroughs to other radical departures from tradition point out how
art and art criticism move in linked cycles.  As a new artist rises up to challenge the status
quo, critics at first often dismiss the effort, but in time people learn how to appreciate the
innovator, who then becomes accepted and critiqued as part of an expanded canon.  It
took time for people to accept Impressionism and Be-Bop; it is time now for people to
take Burroughs seriously as well.
Now we can move on to Burroughs’ second distinctive technique, the routine.
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Routines are short, usually self-contained comic monologues.  Routines may be stand-
alone short stories, or may appear as an episode in a novel.  Junky, Queer, and Naked
Lunch all rely heavily on routines since Burroughs had not yet incorporated the cut-up
technique into his writing.  Routines first developed simply as imaginative storytelling
during the period when Burroughs did not yet consider himself a writer.  Only the
occasional collaborative effort, such as “Twilight’s Last Gleamings” with the help of
Kells Elvins, gave any indication that Burroughs would devote himself to the
“Shakespeare Squadron.”  Morphine (along with other opiates) and lack of self-
confidence were the primary factors in Burroughs’ lack of production, and routines were
an important verbal outlet for his storytelling skills, helping him develop the tools of his
trade even when he wasn’t writing.
Routines lend themselves well to Burroughs’ fragmented, episodic style, for like
cut-ups they can start and end abruptly with only a tangential connection to surrounding
text.  In routines we can clearly see Burroughs’ use of humor, irony, and shock value:
Routines are completely spontaneous and proceed from whatever
fragmentary knowledge you have. . . in fact a routine is by nature
fragmentary and inaccurate.  There is no such thing as an exhaustive
routine, nor does the scholarly-type mind run to routines. . . pure laughter
that accompanies a good routine. . . gives a moment’s freedom from the
cautious, nagging, aging, frightened flesh. (El Hombre Invisible 77)
Routines as described above are Burroughs’ closest stylistic connection to the other
Beats.  When he describes them as spontaneous, we may immediately call to mind
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Kerouac’s writing dictum of “first thought, best thought.”  Routines are imaginative
storytelling at its most unrestrained; when we read them we never know what direction
they will take next. Since irony is a major link between Burroughs and Rorty, we will
devote more space to it later, and concentrate here on the other two features, humor and
shock value.
Both these features, humor and shock value, remind us that routines are based on
appeal to an audience.  Originally, this audience was attractive young men whom
Burroughs wanted to charm into a sexual relationship.  In his introduction to Queer,
Burroughs sees the transition from Junky to Queer in terms of audience:  his alter ego in
Junky, Lee, is self -contained while on junk, needing little in the way of human contact,
while in Queer Lee searches desperately for a personal connection of some kind:
While the addict is indifferent to the impression he creates in others,
during withdrawal he may feel the compulsive need for an audience, and
this is clearly what Lee seeks in Allerton:  an audience, an
acknowledgement of his performance. . . so he invents a frantic attention-
getting format which he calls the Routine:  shocking, funny, riveting. (xv)
This sense of audience which characterizes the early routine writing marks a stage of
development in Burroughs as a writer. He realizes he wants to make a definite impression
upon his audience.  Later, he will learn to internalize this audience and will go beyond the
impulse to impress a particular person.  But he  always adheres to the goal of making his
writing live in the experience of the reader.  “A routine, like a bullfight, needs an
audience.  In fact the audience is an integral part of the routine.  But unlike a bullfight,
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the routine can endanger the audience” (Interzone 127).
Repeatedly Burroughs underscores the outrageousness of the routine.  Routines
give him freedom to develop characters in a narrative format, play with dialogue in a
variety of voices and dialects.  In the routines in Queer we get Texan dialects in the Oil-
Man routine, Middle Eastern jargon in Corn-Hole Gus’ Used Slave Lot.  The
outrageousness of the play in routines comes from the urge to shock his audience while
amusing and enthralling them at the same time.  He wants to push the limits of what they
will listen to as far as possible without actually driving them off.  Both the characters and
the action tend towards the outrageous.  Corn-Hole Gus the Used-Slave Trader and Spare
Ass Annie are good examples of the types of characters one meets in a Burroughs
routine.  The action usually revolves around the comically obscene, such as when Bobo
the Queen’s falling piles get sucked out of a car and wrap around the rear tire:  “He was
completely gutted, leaving an empty shell sitting there on the giraffe-skin upholstery.
Even the eyes and brain went, with a horrible shlupping sound” (Queer 40).  During the
Chess Player routine, his protagonist Lee pauses, “The routine was coming to him like
dictation.  He did not know what he was going to say next but he suspected the
monologue was about to get dirty” (Queer 66).  This sense of imminent danger comes
from the spontaneity of the routine; Lee works by feeling the reactions of his audience
and his outrageous humor could spill over into non-humorous bad taste at any moment.
Part of the humor of routines comes out of this spontaneous peril; the same sort of
laughter which can arise out of fear or nervousness.  Comedians famous for challenging
both their audiences and social conventions, like Lenny Bruce and Andy Kaufman, use
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this same technique of fearful humor which pushes the boundaries of what is acceptable.
This is the dangerous element that Burroughs talks about in relation to routines; he feels
that if they don’t risk shocking the audience, then they haven’t gone far enough. The rest
of the laughter comes from the sheer excessiveness of the routine.  The playfulness of
ridiculous situations, like unlicensed condom peddlers and a man who teaches his anus to
talk, are what makes routines irresistible despite their obscene content.  Early routine
work, like “Twilight’s Last Gleamings” and Queer, allowed him to develop his talent for
outraging people’s sensibilities, which he will apply both within and beyond the routine
format for the rest of his career.  In The Adding Machine essay “Beauty and the
Bestseller,” Burroughs contrasts his own willingness to shock with the publishing
industry’s fear of it, saying “If your purpose is to make a lot of money on a book or a
film, there are certain rules to observe. . . never expect a general public to experience
anything they don’t want to experience” (22).  He is pointing out how this profit motive
insures that most popular art will remain devoid of content which shocks or challenges
the audience, thereby preserving their complacency.  His motives are just the opposite,
for unlike the popular author whose starting point is “how do I sell as many units as
possible?”, Burroughs’ begins by asking “how do I show people things they never
imagined?”  Answering this question will necessarily involve shocking their sensibilities,
because new realms of imaginative experience aren’t always pleasant.  A writer shouldn’t
have to worry, in his opinion, about separating out the “appropriate” from the
“inappropriate” parts.  If he tried for commercial reasons to edit out certain portions of
his experience, the audience would be denied the honesty and integrity of Burroughs’
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work, which spares no detail and makes no apologies for what it is.  “The writer cannot
pull back from what he finds because it shocks or upsets him, or because he fears the
disapproval of the reader” (The Adding Machine 33), Burroughs says, because in doing
so he would be censoring himself before even submitting his work to the publisher.  In
his mind, such commercial considerations will produce only commercial works, which
can sell but have no element of risk or originality.
Shock value is an important component of Burroughs’ writing because he wants
both to amuse and edify his audience.  The reader laughs  because of the bizarre nature of
the action and characters; thus Burroughs works through transgression of cultural taboos.
Like an extended dirty joke which is funny only because we think that certain body parts
and functions are shameful and shouldn’t be mentioned, the routine relies on its power to
break through social conditioning.  This shock value gets his audience’s attention, but
there are also subtle symbolic gestures in his routines.  They invite us to question the
taboos they break. The Oil-Man routine (Queer 29-32) pokes fun at the Good Ol’ Boy
network in Texas, the Bobo the Queen bit (Queer 39-40) makes light of homosexuality,
The Man Who Taught His Asshole to Talk (Naked Lunch 132-135) ridicules our notions
of mind-body separation (and can even be read as an allegory of the growth of
bureaucratic power in democracies), and the Tibetan Holy Man (Queer 81-82) routine
tackles the sanctity we with which we shroud our religious figures.
How is all this ribald humor pragmatic?  Rorty suggests that we stop using a
hierarchical system of thought in which argument takes precedence over literature, and in
the routine Burroughs is using narrative to make his points about art, culture, Western
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thought, and the body. These routines offer a radically different vocabulary from standard
argumentation, a vocabulary which suggests that nothing and no one is sacred and safe
from ridicule.  They lead us into a narrative space where we can laugh at our prejudices
and preconceptions, which then lose some of their hold over us.  As a result we become
more likely to question, to investigate, and to consider alternative points of view.  In
other words, routines offer a redescriptive vocabulary based on humor, and that
vocabulary offers an imaginative vision which offers possibilities for the transformation
of the individual and society.
The third pragmatic technique Burroughs employs is the literalization of
metaphor, which like shock value can be found in routines but is not limited to them.
Just as the name implies, Burroughs takes a common figure of speech and makes its
metaphorical qualities literal.  He takes particular joy in pointing out the ridiculous
thinking and behavior which results when people follow their metaphors too closely.  For
instance, in the short piece “Seeing Red” from Exterminator!, Burroughs takes the line
about pornography destroying society, so often used by censors and guardians of
morality, and presents it as a literal event.  Lee, Burroughs’ alter ego, gets stopped at
customs, as the author himself was so many times.  This time, Lee has a surprise for the
nosy customs agents: a picture of an attractive, sensuous, naked young boy playing a
flute.  In stereotypical fashion, the agents are disgusted by the picture, but it also
fascinates them, and they can’t stop looking at it and talking about it.  Like the anti-
pornography crusaders who maintain vast collections of the very thing they claim to hate,
these customs agents reveal their repressed desires by clustering around the picture.  They
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become enthralled, forgetting completely about Lee, who surreptitiously slips out before
the agents are killed by their own sick fascination.  In characteristic style, Burroughs
makes their end a messy one by having their heads explode, thus making literal all the
exaggerated claims about how dangerous to impressionable minds allegedly
“pornographic” art and literature can be.
This is very much the sort of ironic redescription of vocabularies that Rorty talks
about.  Rorty suggested that from time to time, someone needs to come along and do
some verbal housecleaning, sweeping out all the old, stale, worn-out metaphors and
replacing them with new ones.  Burroughs is quite dedicated to this task, revealing how
many of our repressive, racist, fascist, and otherwise undesirable ideas come from the
language we use to form our thoughts and speech.  Like cut-ups, literalizing these old
metaphors is a way of “cutting word lines,” of getting rid of old patterns of thought and
speech so that we can begin creating or absorbing new ones.  For example, the routine of
the Talking Asshole literalizes the metaphors of mind-body separation, a Cartesian
dualism that Burroughs ridicules frequently.  Burroughs sets up this literalization by
creating a scene in which someone’s body splits off from the mind’s control and asserts
its own independent will.  The humor lies in Burroughs’ symbolic choice for the new
controlling body part:  the anus, which ranks probably lowest on the hierarchy of
people’s preferred organs.  This literalized metaphor shows us that we don’t have the
absolute control over our bodies that we would like to think we have, and it points out the
consequences of what might happen if the mind and body really were separate organisms:
the mind, which we Westerners see as the seat of our “selves,” might lose out to the body,
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the part of us that Christian dogma has taught us to fear and despise.
But ironist writers like Burroughs are not the only ones who can take metaphors
literally.  Certain kinds of foundationalists also have this tendency, although to vastly
different ends.  Foundationalists entertain no doubts whatsoever about the final
vocabulary they use to describe themselves and their world, and as a result tend to
become highly intolerant of other interpretations.  Whenever there is a specific written
script for that foundationalist’s final vocabulary, as is the case for Christians, Jews, and
Muslims, that text tends to become enshrined and mummified so as to disallow any
alterations or competing interpretations of it.  This does not happen with all such people,
only with a small but highly vocal minority, who can best be described as zealotsiv.
For zealots, the goal is to narrow the possibilities for interpretation as much as
possible, so in the end the only possible acceptable interpretation of the text will be their
own.  One of the best ways to achieve this end is to insist upon literal interpretation.  By
controlling the ways in which people are allowed to speak about texts, vested interests
can control the values and policies which arise out of those texts.  For example,
conservativev policy makers and pundits have recently made much of the literal
interpretation of the Constitution in its descriptions of how the Census should be
undertaken.  This was not done just out of conscience or respect for that document, since
the same conservative forces do not push for strict following of the Constitution when it
comes to issues of search and seizure in drug policy.  The literal interpretation of the
Census procedures insured that fewer minority and poor citizens would be counted, thus
reducing their representation and funding, a trend which the right wing tends to favor.
68
But such vested interests never admit to such an agenda, preferring instead to claim the
sanctity of literal interpretation.  By showing the end-products of such literalness, ironists
like Burroughs can show us how being literal is often just an excuse for being cruel and
selfish.
Beyond just protecting vested interests, true zealots often insist on literalness even
when it isn’t in anyone’s favor, simply because it limits the “approved” ways of speaking
about important texts.  In other words, it is simply an issue of control.  Take, for example.
the Christian Right’s insistence on the evils of homosexuality, a trait which certainly did
not endear them to Burroughs.  Persecuting homosexuals (and trying to strike down anti-
discriminatory laws which could help protect them) doesn’t really benefit anyone,
including the Christian Right, but they insist upon it nonetheless.  Ironists like Burroughs
do just the opposite; they increase the proliferation of meanings which can be derived
from texts.  He does so by casting foundationalist literal interpretations in a horrific
and/or ridiculous manner, making them by turns repulsive and ludicrous.  Burroughs calls
into question the basic assumptions of commonly-held viewpoints, and one of the best
ways to do that is to make us look more closely at the terms and images we use to express
those viewpoints.
In Ghost of Chance, Burroughs takes several of the literal interpretations of the
Bible seriously, and in doing so makes them utterly insane:
The Literalists—or “Lits” as they came to be known—actually put the
words of Christ into disastrous practice.  Now Christ says if some son of a
bitch takes half your clothes, give him the other half.  Accordingly, Lits
69
stalk the streets looking for muggers and strip themselves mother naked at
the sight of one.  Many unfortunate muggers were crushed under
scrimmage pileups of half-naked Lits. (35)
Burroughs continues in this vein by showing a few of the other bizarre antics of the
Literalists, including criminals who go around begging their enemies for forgiveness, and
special services arising to provide professional enemies to those unfortunate Lits unable
to scare up any of their own.  Through the use of shocking and humorous images,
Burroughs shows us the ridiculous results of a literalist agenda.
The fourth and last technique I will discuss in relation to Burroughs’ pragmatism
is his manipulation of vocabularies and narrative perspectives.  I have already explained
how he sometimes uses cut-ups to achieve this effect, but just as shock value can be seen
as a technique on its own and is not confined to routines, perspective shift is frequently
used without cut-ups as a marker.  Readers can learn to recognize these shifts by the
change in vocabulary, although Burroughs may also graphically indicate the shift with
dashes or ellipses.  For example, in Nova Express he moves from his hustler-reporter
persona, distinguished by the use of street hustler and Beat slang, to a young Mexican
boyfriend, distinguished by the use of Spanish and Mexican slang:
I woke out of a light yen sleep when the Japanese girl came in--Three
silver digits exploded in my head--I walked out into streets of Madrid and
won a football pool--felt the Latin mind clear and banal as sunlight met
Paco by the soccer scores and he said: "Que tal Henrique?"
And I went to see my amigo who was taking medicina again and
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he had no money to give me and didn't want to do anything but take more
medicina and stood there waiting for me to leave so he could take it after
saying he was not going to take anymore so I said, "William no me hagas
caso". (26)
The reader is led quite abruptly from the perspective of one character into that of another
through vocabulary shift.  The only graphic marker is the paragraph break.  Burroughs
does this frequently and deliberately, playing vocabularies off against each other in
dialectic fashion.  The author, reader, and characters escape the confines of physicality by
imagination, through which a change in language means a change in persona.
The destabilizing of identity which accompanies frequent and abrupt vocabulary
shifting helps undermine the fundamental binary opposition of Self / Other thinking, the
type of pattern which Burroughs believed to be one of the most divisive and destructive.
Burroughs wants his readers to experience the blurring and merging of identities through
his works in order to break our conditioning and enable us think beyond this dichotomy:
Consider the IS of identity.  When I say to be me, to be you, to be myself,
to be others--Whatever I may be called upon to be or say that I am--I am
not the verbal label "myself."  The word BE in English contains, as a virus
contains, its precoded message of damage, the categorical imperative of
permanent condition. (The Job 200)
This either/or dichotomy is another of the "word lines" that Burroughs cuts, and
perspective shift is a distinct and specifically directed tool for cutting it.  He sometimes
indicates this shift with ellipses, as in this science fiction piece from The Ticket That
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Exploded:
. . He's going to eat you slow and nasty. . . This situation here has given
rise to what the head shrinkers call 'ideas of persecution' among our
personnel and a marked slump in morale. . As I write this I have
barricaded myself in a ward room against the second lieutenant who
claims he is 'God's little hang boy sent special to me' that fucking shave
tail I can hear him out there whimpering and slobbering and the Colonel is
jacking off in front of the window pointing to a Gemini Sex Skin (5).
The first sentence is the voice of the second lieutenant who is under the control of the Sex
Skin,  the second is a psychoanalyst commenting on the scene, while the third is an
unfortunate Tech Sargent who is about to be consumed by the Sex Skin fiends.  Each
break into a different perspective is marked by ellipses (or sometimes just a pair of dots
or a dash), but there is no other specific pattern followed; some perspectives present only
a single image of horror or fear, while others run for paragraphs or pages.  There is no
predicting when the next shift will occur; Burroughs lets each one have its say, short or
long.  Again, notice how each one has its own vocabulary.  The psychoanalytic voice is
dry and technical, while the voice of the frightened Tech Sargent is breathlessly full of
swear words.  This is dialectic as Rorty describes it, the play of various vocabularies off
each other.
Burroughs’ use of dialectic routines and cut-ups all fit into a pragmatic
framework.  Each technique is designed to provide the reader with edifying experiences,
as Rorty would put it.  Furthermore, the author is reaching for new realms of imaginative
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experience, which according to Dewey is one of the hallmarks of worthwhile art:  it
allows for new expressions to fit changing times.  In his desire to know the real-world
effects of his ideas, and to investigate the cash-value (the outcome or product ) of all
writings, including his own, William Burroughs is an American Pragmatist.  In the next
chapter, I will show how he fits a Rortyean role as Liberal Ironist.  Using Dewey’s ideas
about synthesis, I cover some of the ways in which Burroughs’ work can be connected to
political and social issues.
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i I realize this looks awkward, but as Burroughs said, the idea of simultaneity is difficult to project in prose.
I put both present and past tense because time lines blend and merge in this and other Burroughs books,
making it difficult to say whether any particular event occurs alongside, before, or after another.  In other
words, I am trying to convey the sense of non-linear structure that I obtained from the book itself.
ii This may be compared in our own time to the controversy over  rappers’ uses of samples from other
artists.  These artists often felt that their beats and melodies had been “stolen” by the rappers.  The rappers,
on the other hand, claimed that they were using the samples openly as part of an original work.  The
controversy has since died down after it became standard practice to acknowledge sources by listing all the
artists who have been sampled in the compact disc’s credits.
iii The phrase “burned down” is street slang for a place drug users can no longer visit because one of their
number has already acted so badly that the authorities are now on alert there.
iv Although the religious connotation of this term is certainly appropriate, I am using the word more in the
general sense of one who has excessive passion about any belief or system of values.  Although Burroughs
attacks all foundationalist thought, he reserves his most vitriolic condemnations for those who are fanatical
in their foundationalism, and these extremists are the ones I choose to call zealots.  The danger of these
people in Burroughs’ eyes is two fold; they excite others towards hatred and intolerance through their
words, and they are usually the ones most willing to act on their beliefs even to the point of harming or
killing those they see as living in contradiction of their coveted belief systems.
v Although we could draw historical parallels between intolerance and conservatism, it is equally true that
liberals can be zealots too, as witnessed by groups like Earth First! and PETA.  Burroughs could at times
have as much disdain for certain kinds of liberals as he could for conservatives.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LIBERAL AND IRONIST POLITICS OF WILLIAM S. BURROUGHS
Americans have a long history of liberal politics; we come out of a culture which
pays due attention (and even more lip-service) to the ideals of a liberal democracy.
Although we could easily devise a long list of times and places in which we have failed
to live up to these liberal ideals, this only confirms the contention that we need to
broaden and deepen our discussion of these issues, finding newer and better ways to put
them into practice. American pragmatism is part of this progressive, liberal tradition.
Dewey and Rorty agree that philosophy should serve the needs of actual human beings,
making their lives better, offering their futures greater possibilities.  Rorty calls for a
liberal democratic society which promotes human solidarity while still allowing for
individual liberties.  In order to promote the liberal practices (rather than just liberal
theory) which would make such a society possible, Rorty sketches a figure he calls the
“liberal ironist,” who would be the ideal citizen of his liberal democracy.  To explain the
liberal part, Rorty borrows Judith Shklar’s definition, who says that “liberals are the
people who think that cruelty is the worst thing we do” (Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity xv).  The ironist part, which means someone who accepts the contingency of
their own final vocabulary and enjoys experimenting with others, was covered in the first
chapter of this work.
 Although Rorty has done good work by bringing pragmatism back into
discussion, he has attracted a great deal of criticism, some of it spiteful, some of it
warranted.  In his insightful study of Rorty’s liberal ironism, The Last Conceptual
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Revolution, Eric Gander points out some of the problems in Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity.  He thinks that Rorty omits or glosses over some of the difficult issues in
liberalism.  In particular, Gander takes issue with Rorty’s (and Shklar’s) definition of
what it means to be liberal.  Gander takes the definition to mean that only the willful and
deliberate infliction of suffering is cruelty, so Rorty is only concerned with the
motivation for acts which cause suffering.  Otherwise, accidental harm caused to
someone else could be also be called cruelty:  “it seems that Rorty can either remain on
the surface and dispense with Shklar’s definition of cruelty, or, he can embrace this
notion of cruelty, complete with its focus on the intentionality of the actor, and thereby
obligate himself to get below the surface and inspect final vocabularies” (The Last
Conceptual Revolution 71).  If Rorty has to worry about people’s final vocabularies, then
his liberal society must restrict people’s private pursuit of self-creation in order to prevent
cruelty.  In other words, Gander, like so many Rorty critics, sees no way that Rorty’s
ideal society can be for both human solidarity and the private pursuit of perfection. But as
is common with critics of Rorty, Gander is (at least partially) criticizing Rorty for his
style, which is narrative rather than argumentative.  Rorty is giving a working definition
in the context of a narrative presentation, not a conclusive and final definition which he
hopes will “ground” or solidify his “argument,” because this is the kind of thinking he
wants to replace.  By insisting on such a narrow understanding of Rorty’s liberalism,
Gander overlooks many of the implications of Rorty’s ideas about liberalism.
Gander is correct that there are problems with using only the cruelty-based
definition of liberalism,  but if we read Rorty thoroughly, we can see that he really
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doesn’t rely as heavily on Judith Shklar as Gander thinks.  For instance, Rorty also
describes the proper functions of “liberal institutions and customs,” which are “to
diminish cruelty, make possible government by the consent of the governed, and permit
as much domination-free communication as possible to take place” (Contingency, Irony,
and Solidarity 68).  The free exchange of communication is particularly important
because Rorty doesn’t think that the government should be the only arbiter of who and
what is suffering.  He believes that “J.S. Mill’s suggestion that governments devote
themselves to optimizing the balance between leaving people’s private lives alone and
preventing suffering seems to me pretty much the last word.  Discoveries about who is
being made to suffer can be left to the workings of a free press, free universities, and
enlightened public opinion” (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 63).  Rorty does not
have to abandon Shklar, but he probably should make more explicit his reliance on a
variety of social and governmental institutions to make her definition work better.  He
should also expand on his use of Mill, who in On Liberty provides an excellent picture of
the tension between the liberal goals of insuring both private freedoms and the public
good.  Because Rorty implicitly relies upon Mill as a starting point for a lot of ideas
related to civil liberties, Rorty should spend more time placing Mill’s British
Utilitarianism as a precursor and supporter of American Pragmatism.   By doing so, he
can help his audience understand better how he pictures the balance between private
liberties and the public good, a crucial element in any movement towards actual political
improvement.
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When I speak of American liberalism, I would like to characterize it further than
Rorty, although I think the ideals of liberalism certainly include government by consent,
fostering conditions which allow the free exchange of ideas and the elimination of
suffering as a worthy, if never-fully-attained, goal (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity
68).  Following loosely in the tradition of Locke, Jefferson, and Mill, I would add that a
liberal vocabulary should also include discussion of issues such as the importance of
guaranteed rights to a free society, ways to avoid tyranny of the majority over dissenting
minorities, equality of opportunity, and, trickiest of all, balancing the needs of society
with the liberties of the individual.
Through his works, William Burroughs participates in the American tradition of
pragmatic, liberal thinkers, voicing his thoughts on the liberal issues I have just listed in a
literary format.  We ought to keep in mind that being a pragmatist does not mean that one
is a pure Rortyean thinker, subscribing to all of Richard Rorty’s notions about liberal
democratic values.  In some ways Burroughs and Rorty see eye to eye; in other ways
Burroughs fits better with Mill, and in some ways he is more radical about preserving
individual liberties than either Rorty or Mill.  But seeing Burroughs as part of a wider
pragmatist tradition serves useful ends, enabling us to understand his works better and
place them within a valuable cultural and intellectual context.   Many people seem to be
under the impression that Burroughs has little to say at all, thinking of him as a drugged-
out nihilist or sensationalist, a reputation that has dogged him since the publication of
Naked Lunch, a reputation probably confirmed rather than refuted by the obscenity trial
brought against him for that booki.  Yet close examination of his publications, his
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methods, and his own theories about writing and culture presented in  interviews reveal
that William Burroughs has left a powerful legacy of artistic and intellectual work that
bears a distinctly liberal pragmatic bent.
William S. Burroughs works towards liberal ends in many respects, attacking
cultural sources of cruelty and humiliation and exposing the evils behind a multitude of
vocabularies (many of them American because he knows these best), airing their dirtiest
verbal laundry in his works.  He mocks them in his narrative sections, then subsumes
them into his cut-up sections.  He dissects their speech patterns, attacking them with their
own final vocabularies.  He exaggerates and magnifies their hatred in his routines,
revealing plainly the naked lunch of racism, homophobia, robber-baron corporate
capitalism, anti-intellectualism, authoritarianism, cultural arrogance, and malicious
destructiveness that Americans are fed every day by government, society, the media, and
family.
All this work to bring attention to cruelty in speech and action fits in with Rorty’s
praise of authors like Orwell who serve society by revealing its faults: “Novelists can do
something which is socially useful: help us attend to the springs of cruelty in ourselves”
(Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 94).  Note that Rorty praises novelists for a socially-
inscribed end-product of their work, and uses the plural “ourselves,” suggesting that he,
like Burroughs, attempts to edify a Western, and more specifically, American, readership.
Unlike Rorty, Burroughs is not above being cruel himself, inflicting humiliation upon
those who act habitually in such manner towards others.  As a novelist, William S.
Burroughs is not constrained by any of the conventions of philosophical discourse (i.e.
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maintaining a calm, polite, emotionally-detached conversation) as Rorty is, so the styles
of these two writers could hardly be more different.  William Burroughs is also much
more interested in the vocabulary (and the act) of violence.  Burroughs had a life-long
fascination with violence and its tools; he dabbled in various martial arts techniques, like
jujitsu and knife-fighting, and collected weapons of all kinds, especially guns.  He often
uses depictions of violence to represent the dangers of the struggle for freedom from
control, for he believed that violence was often necessary in order to defend oneself
against those who have no respect for human life or liberty:  “There’s a lot of violence in
my work because violence is obviously necessary in certain circumstances.  I’m often
talking in a revolutionary, guerilla context where violence is the only recourse . . . How
can you protect people without weapons?” (Burroughs qtd. in McCaffery 35).  Burroughs
had a habit not only of collecting but carrying guns and other weapons on his person, a
habit which resulted in the most tragic incident in his life.ii
For Rorty, much of the tension and difficulty of liberal politics centers on the
opposition between foundationalists and liberal ironists. Rorty believes that
foundationalists and ironists can coexist peacefully in the same society, as long as we all
agree to use the public rhetoric of human solidarity and restrict our use of contingent final
vocabularies to the private pursuit of perfection. Burroughs, on the other hand, has quite a
different opinion, suggesting through his own unique terminology and themes that
dissension and even violence between these two groups is practically inevitable.  The
ironist group he calls “Johnsons,” after a book he read as a youth that influenced him
greatly, You Can’t Win by Jack Black.  This was the story of old-time hustlers, hoboes,
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and short-coniii men as told by one of their own.  A Johnson is a decent human being who
“just minds his own business of staying alive and thinks that what other people do is
other people’s business. . . wouldn’t rush to the law if he smelled hop in the hall, doesn’t
care what the fags in the back room are doing, stands by his word” (The Adding Machine
15).  A Johnson, then, is one who puts Rorty’s ideas about the separation between public
and private vocabularies into practice, and who respects other people’s right to have
different values and ideas about self-perfection.  Johnsons are pragmatic and ironist
enough to do the business of public life with any reasonable person, for they recognize
the contingency of their own vocabulary and so are willing to tolerate the differences they
may have with other people.  In interviews, Burroughs made explicit the connection
between Johnson sentiments and liberal sentiments:  “I just think liberals are, well,
Johnsons—reasonable people who have some sort of sense of moderation and common
sense and are not in some state of hysterical, self-righteous anger” (From the Bunker
246).
That Burroughs felt persecuted by non-ironists all his life is obvious by the name
he bestows upon this group:  “Shits.”  These are all the kinds of people he detests, the
ones he ridicules and heaps execrations upon, the numerous “nigger-killin’ lawmen,” fat,
braying Southern Senators, and “decent, church-going women with their mean, pinched,
bitter, evil faces” (Dead City Radio).  As foundationalists of the most extreme kind, Shits
possess a limited and highly polarized final vocabulary which renders them ill-equipped
for citizenship in Rorty’s liberal democracy.  They are not only unable to entertain doubts
about this vocabulary, they are completely incapable of tolerating any other vocabulary
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which differs substantially from their own:  “He [the Shit leader] organized a vast
Thought Police.  Anybody with an absent-minded expression was immediately arrested
and executed.  Anyone who expressed any ideas that deviated in any way from decent
church-going morality suffered the same fate.  The American Moral Disease passed into
its terminal stage” (Port of Saints 22).  The American Moral Disease is the hysterical
self-righteousness of Shits, The Ugly American Spirit, people who know that they are in
the right, and everyone who disagrees is not just wrong, but evil and immoral.  Burroughs
learned why these people seem incapable of tolerance and compassion from a bit of
advice given to him as a young man:  “Yes, this world would be a pretty easy and
pleasant place to live in if everybody could just mind his own business and let others do
the same.  But a wise old black faggot said to me years ago:  ‘Some people are shits,
darling.’ I was never able to forget it” (The Adding Machine 15). Burroughs thus
identifies Shits with the social and political forces which have always assumed they were
in the right, and who thus felt justified in persecuting and punishing anyone who was not
of the same mindset.  He sees the struggle between Shits and Johnsons in Manichaean
terms, in which a victory for one group is a loss for the other:  “Good and evil are in a
state of conflict.  The outcome is uncertain.  This is not an eternal conflict since one or
the other will win out in this universe” (Place of Dead Roads 102).  This struggle is not
just for control but ultimately for survival, because the Shits are making atomic weapons,
polluting the environment, exterminating species, and generally rendering Earth unfit for
human habitation.
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Although both Rorty and Burroughs want to talk about the tensions between
foundationalists and ironists,  they differ in their choice of descriptions.  For both of
them, the difference is essentially a question of language, but where Rorty uses
vocabularies, Burroughs uses a virus metaphor:
We have observed that most of the trouble in the world is caused by ten to
twenty percent of folks who can’t seem to mind their own business
because they have no business of their own to mind any more than a
smallpox virus.  Now your virus is an obligate cellular parasite, and my
contention is that what we call evil is quite literally a virus parasite
occupying a certain brain area which we may term the RIGHT center.  The
mark of a basic shit is that he has to be right. (Place of Dead Roads 155)
Around the time of the writing of Naked Lunch, Burroughs began developing his theories
about Shits, the Word as Virus, and possession of human agents by aliens, and continued
to expand and revise these ideas for the rest of his career.  In order to understand  his
body of work as a whole, it is worthwhile that we take some time to study these ideas.
As the quote above implies, Burroughs found himself wondering why Shits act the way
they do, bringing misery and pain to others for the satisfaction of feeling themselves
proven to be right.  He began by postulating that many of these people were actually
agents, acting under the orders of some other malevolent entity.  His fascination with the
vocabulary of the science fiction genre led him to call these controlling entities aliens.
During the early sixties, his cut-up experiments in different formats led him to the idea
that language, the Word, was a virus, transmitted from person to person, society to
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society.  This virus replicates itself as all viruses do, and leads us to think and act in
certain patterns, often to our own detriment.  Eventually he combined these two lines of
thought, creating a scenario in which aliens controlled human agents through the Word
Virus, which occupies the RIGHT center of the brain, causing the host to become
intolerant and authoritative.  Such hosts further alien goals by aggravating existing
conflicts and creating new conflicts wherever possible.  The aliens want humans to labor
under oppressive and dogmatic authority because (as Mill suggests in On Liberty)
individuality leads to creativity in thought and deed, and the aliens want humans to be as
submissive and predictable as possible.  To Burroughs, this is a Manichaean conflict, and
the aliens want to ultimately exterminate the human race and become masters of earth,
remaking it in their own hellish image.  Thus, the aliens are willing to undertake any
steps which diminish human capacity for cooperative living and new avenues of
expression and action.  Rorty and Dewey also stress the importance of new avenues of
expression, new vocabularies to replace the old, worn-out ones.  Like Burroughs, they
believe that individuality and creativity are important cultural resources which ought to
be cultivated, rather than stifled for the sake of conformity.  All three of these pragmatists
see cash-value in individual liberties and the variety of citizens such liberties help to
foster.
To understand his devotion to the Johnson cause, we need to picture William
Burroughs as a man who loves freedom and champions the rights of the individual.
Much of his writing and attention is devoted to discovering and challenging ways in
which the free development of a person is hindered or arrested by the authoritative Shits.
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In his works, he investigates what he calls Control, which is shorthand for any pressure
brought to bear upon a person which affects the exercise of free will.  William Burroughs
looks at biological controls, such as drugs and sex, governmental controls, such as laws,
codes, and police, and social controls, like community standards of behavior and custom.
The most basic and pervasive tool of Control, however, is language:
[W]ords are still the principal instruments of control.  Suggestions are
words. Persuasions are words.  Orders are words.  No control machine so
far devised can operate without words, and any control machine which
attempts to do so relying entirely on external force or entirely on physical
control of the mind will soon encounter the limits of control. (The Adding
Machine 117)
In his study of Control, Burroughs has found limits, gaps, and inconsistencies, and
his books are edifying presentations of this understanding.  At times Control may seem
monolithic and omnipresent, because we have internalized through language many of the
operating principles of Control.  But Burroughs takes pains to show how the struggle
against Control can be fought successfully, if one has the right tools and techniques.
Often the very means of controlling us also provides our liberation, such as the use of text
cut-ups to break language conditioning, or the use of  the drug apomorphine to break
addiction to other drugs.
Drugs are one of Burroughs’ earliest and most pervasive metaphors of control,
and one of the issues which for him most clearly delineates the differences in thought and
deed between Shits and Johnsons.  I would like to put this difference in its historical
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context by looking at the ways in which we have dealt, politically and socially, with
drugs in America, so that we may better understand why this issue became so important
to him.  I believe that Burroughs is reacting against our Puritan heritage, what he calls
“The American Moral Disease,” which can be traced back through the various morality
campaigns, such as the Nineteenth-Century Temperance movement, or the Moral
Majority of the 1980’s.  The people involved in these movements are foundationalists
who adhere to a rigid set of principles, usually religious ones, which tells them not only
how they should act, but tells them that they must persuade or coerce (if necessary) others
to act the same way.  Burroughs frequently quotes former Drug Crusader Harry J.
Anslinger as an example of such thinking:  “Drug laws must reflect society’s disapproval
of the addict” (Place of Dead Roads 155).  Such people are not afraid to shoulder the
burden of being “their brother’s keeper,” and they are more than willing to take action to
protect the rest of us from ourselves.
In his study of America’s historical relationship with alcohol, The Alcoholic
Republic:  An American Tradition, W.J. Rorabaugh shows us that right from the
beginning of our republic, moralists and civil libertarians were already at odds:
Drinkers had claimed that to become intoxicated was their right as free
men.  Now, [during the Temperance crusades of the 1830’s and 40’s] that
idea was challenged and freedom redefined.  A man no longer had the
right to seek personal indulgence, to attain selfish gratification, to act
alone and apart from others. (200)
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Both sides are offering competing descriptions of our rights.  On the one hand, liberals
claim that each individual may judge how he or she shall live, and this includes the right
to make what may seem to others as foolish or self-destructive choices.  Burroughs would
agree with this sentiment wholeheartedly, saying a Johnson thinks what other people do
is their business, and as long as they don’t try to force him to act in their fashion, he
would never interfere in the choices that another person makes. The moral crusaders
argue that one’s individual choices must be viewed in a larger social or ethical context,
that these choices inevitably affect those around us.  Such temperance and anti-narcotic
advocates operate from a social-standards philosophy, which says that individuals do not
have the right to behave in ways that violate the standards of conduct of their society.
Burroughs sees this line of thinking as hypocritical and self-righteous, seeing no reason
that people in a liberal democracy should have to conform to someone else’s standards of
behavior.  Part of the problem comes from his opposition to organized religion, especially
Christianity, for  often these standards of behavior that are invoked by moralists come
from religious principles:
Most Americans, however, did accept abstinence as a sign of grace.
During the late 1820’s religious fervor peaked in a wave of revivals that
swept across the country, that brought large numbers of new members into
old congregations, and that led to the establishment of many new
churches.  This periods of rising interest in religion coincided with the first
popular success of a campaign against alcohol.  The two were inexorably
linked. (The Alcoholic Republic 210)
87
This link between religious fervor and politicized morality continued and is with us
today.  In our own times, we might consider the impact of the Christian Coalition or the
Southern Baptist Convention upon political parties and rhetoric.  In their rhetoric, drug
and alcohol use are still condemned not as unhealthy but as immoral, largely due to their
pleasurable intoxicating effects which are said to ignite sinful desires for sex, violence,
and other immoral behaviors.  This morality rhetoric has maintained a stranglehold on
public discussions of drug, tobacco, and alcohol policy, and politicians dare not refuse to
support laws which punish drug users lest they be accused of promoting public
immorality and be voted out of office.
The other half of anti-drug and alcohol crusades comes from those concerned
about the social standards of public health and safety, although they too are ultimately
arguing for some form of public morality.  In his study of narcotic policies in the United
States, The American Disease, Dr. David Musto says:
Those seeking strict narcotic controls believed that either the need for
money to buy drugs or a direct physiological incitement to violence led to
crime and immoral behavior.  Inordinate pleasure caused by drugs,
moreover, was seen to provide youth with a poor foundation for character
development, and a resulting loss of independence and productivity.
(American Disease 244)
Notice the similarity between these two vocabularies.  One speaks in terms of religiously-
derived morality while the other speaks of public safety, but both boil down to the failure
of certain individuals, in this case drug users, to live up to what some people see as
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“natural” standards of conduct, given to us by tradition, God, or some other (often vague
when invoked) transcendent source of authority.  Both groups describe drug users like
errant children, a danger to themselves and society at large, and this description of users
therefore justifies the need for punishments to be brought to bear upon these offenders of
decency.  A minority of Americans must be scapegoated so that a larger group can see
their vision of social standards (and thus their moralistic final vocabularies) vindicated.
This is the sort of American moralism which Burroughs saw brought to bear upon
anyone who stood out as different from the crowd.  Biographically, he claimed to have
felt persecuted by moralists all his life, despite his relatively affluent WASP upbringing
in St. Louis society.  Much of the material on his early life in the biographies Literary
Outlaw and El Hombre Invisible  confirms Burroughs’ outcast state.  As both a drug user
and a homosexual, William Burroughs grew up and matured in a society which
constantly described his private actions as deviant and disgusting, and he returned
society’s disapproval with his own indignation at their reactionary judgment of him.  He
came to identify with the petty criminals and con men of You Can’t Win, people who
rejected the moral codes of society and lived by their own standards.
Beyond his personal feelings of isolation and difference from the norms of his
time, Burroughs sees drug and alcohol policies as deeply deceptive and destructive, a
mere excuse for exercising the heavy hand of authority:
I suggest that the official opposition to drugs is a sham, that all the policies
of the American Narcotics Department. . . are deliberately designed to
spread the use of drugs, and the consequent unwise laws against the use of
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drugs.  Thus youth is deliberately led into these dead-end channels which
are then made criminal by act of Congress or Parliament.  This elementary
chess move puts potential opposition in a concentration camp of
criminality, weakened by the effects of such murderous drugs as
methedrine. . . In short, drugs are an excellent method of state control; but
this can never be uncovered by legalization, which they will fight all the
way. (The Job 134)
Historically speaking, any time a society authorizes the persecution of a segment of its
citizenry, we may suspect that the rhetoric of public standards so fervently advanced by
reformers may only mask the worst sorts of prejudicial attitudes and injustices, which is
exactly what Burroughs claims about the War on Drugs.  For example, much is made of
the high moral ideals of the Temperance movement.  They claimed to work in the name
of the family and respect for human life, and they allied themselves with the Abolitionist
cause.  Yet if forced to choose between Temperance and the abolition of slavery,
Early reformers considered temperance the more crucial reform.  They
argued that while slavery encouraged the master to idleness and vice, and
the slave to ignorance and religious indifference, the effect of drink was
worse:  a slave had only lost control of his body, a drunkard lost mastery
of his soul. (Alcoholic Republic 214)
Any moralist who claims the tavern a greater evil than the slave market is clearly not
attuned to the sufferings of other human beings.  Likewise, during the anti-drug
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campaigns of the early and mid twentieth century, public rhetoric of moral reform
masked the same old American ugliness, racism:
The most passionate support for legal prohibition of narcotics has been
associated with fear of a given drug’s effect on a specific minority.
Certain drugs were dreaded because they seemed to undermine essential
social restrictions which kept these groups under control:  cocaine was
supposed to enable blacks to withstand bullets which would kill normal
persons and to stimulate sexual assault.  Fear that smoking opium
facilitated sexual contact between Chinese and White Americans was also
a factor in its prohibition.  Chicanos in the Southwest were believed to be
incited to violence by smoking marihuana.  Heroin was linked in the
1920’s with a turbulent age group:  adolescents in reckless and
promiscuous urban gangs.  Alcohol was associated with immigrants
crowding into large and corrupt cities.  In each instance, use of a particular
drug was attributed to an identifiable and threatening minority group.
(American Disease 244-45)
We have only to look today at the disparity in penalties for crack cocaine users, the
majority of whom are black, with the penalties for powder cocaine users, the majority of
whom are white, to see that such racism is still operant in American drug policy and
rhetoric today.  Burroughs frequently makes the same connection , as in this passage from
The Soft Machine where a despicable Southern Senator combines the rhetoric of drug
hysteria and racism:
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A Southern Senator sticks his fat frog face out of the outhouse and brays
with inflexible authority:  “And Ah advocates the extreme penalty in the
worst from there is for anyone convicted of trafficking in, transporting,
selling or caught using the narcotic substance known as nutmeg. . . I
wanna say further that ahm a true friend of the Nigra, and understand all
his simple wants.  Why, I got a good Darkie in here now wiping my ass.”
(116)
Burroughs has several levels of satirical play working in this scene.  The Senator is both a
Shit and full of Shit, as is symbolized by his placement in an outhouse.  That he speaks
without any real understanding of drug issues is evidenced by his fear of the “narcotic”
nutmeg, which is actually a spice and has only the mildest of mind-altering effects even
when taken in extreme dosages.  His claim to understand the problems of minorities is
equally laughable, given that he calls them “Nigras” and “Darkies,” and plainly is
comfortable with such people performing the most degrading tasks imaginable.  At the
end of The Ticket That Exploded, Burroughs describes the “Control Machine” which uses
“the ugliest stupidest most vulgar and degraded sounds for recording and playback” on an
infinite loop, recording, playing back the sounds, and re-recording them (215).  Much of
the ugliness comes from drug and racial intolerance:
marijuana marijuana why that’s deadlier than cocaine
it will turn a man into a homicidal maniac he said steadily his eyes
cold as he thought of the vampires who suck riches from the vile traffic in
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pot quite literally swollen with human blood he reflected grimly and his
jaw set pushers should be pushed into the electric chair
strip the bastards naked
all right let’s see your arms
or in the mortal words of harry j anslinger the laws must reflect
society’s disapproval of the addict
an uglier reflection than society’s disapproval would be hard to
find the mean cold eyes of decent american women tight lips and no thank
you from the shop keeper snarling cops pale nigger killing eyes reflecting
society’s disapproval fucking queers I say shoot them [. . . ] (216)
This is the culmination of a long section of blended cut-up and narrative called “the
invisible generation” in which Burroughs shows us how the verbal programming we give
and receive is part of a linguistic system, and he wants us to see that Word Lines (the
language in which we both speak and think) can be programmed for “calmness and good
sense” or hatred and conflict (205-217).  The quote above demonstrates the way Shits can
spew hatred about drug users, racial minorities, and homosexuals all in the same breath.
The juxtaposition of racism and drug intolerance reinforces the connection that
Burroughs wants us to see between all forms of the Shit attitude of mindless hatred of
contingent and (to him) harmless differences between individualsiv.
In light of such a cultural context of hypocrisy and fear-mongering, William
Burroughs is quite justified in seeing the War on Drugs as an all-out assault on human
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liberties, instituted by governmental authorities to control us and distract us from the
severe problems created by an exploitative and rapacious corporate economy:
To distract their charges from the problems of overpopulation, resource
depletion, deforestation, pandemic pollution of water, land, and sky, they
inaugurated a war against drugs. This provided a pretext to set up an
international police apparatus designed to suppress dissidence on an
international level. (Ghost of Chance 29)
What better way to further control of the populace than a war?  This war is inflicted upon
the very people that are supposed to be protected, civilians.  Any other time a war is
perpetrated upon civilians, it is declared an atrocity, but the invidiousness of the War on
Drugs is that it is a war designed to save us from ourselves.  The rhetoric of war is so
suitable for oppression, because people actually expect their rights to be curtailed during
wartime.  Rights of forfeiture, search and seizure, and worst of all, free speech, have all
been eroded by this war.
As a writer whose own works have been censored, Burroughs understands first-
hand how critical free-speech rights are in the battle against Control.  Because he sees the
War on Drugs as representative of the worst tendencies of American politics, Burroughs
has turned to it again and again as a motif of Control, especially the control of public
opinion:  “As William von Raab of the U.S. Customs Service said: ‘This is a war and
anyone who even suggests a tolerant attitude towards drug use should be considered a
traitor’” (Ghost of Chance 30).  Burroughs is showing us how bizarre and destructive to
our common liberty drug war rhetoric can be, when expressing even the mildest of pro-
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drug sentiments brings down accusations of treachery.  This stifling of our public
discourse not only ensures that no one will dare question official policy on this issue, but
implicitly works to quash all discourse which does not fit in with approved opinion.
Burroughs’ fierce response to this absurd “war” follows directly in the civil
liberties tradition of Mill.  In On Liberty, Mill places the rights to freedom of thought and
freedom to express those thoughts as primary rights which must be guaranteed in a free
society:
This, then is the appropriate region of human liberty.  It comprises, first,
the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of conscience in
the most comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and feeling, absolute
freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative,
scientific, moral, or theological.  The liberty of expressing and publishing
opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to
that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people, but,
being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself and
resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.
(11-12)
Mill takes great pains to delineate the importance of freedom of conscience and speech,
devoting parts of Chapter One and all of Chapter Two to this topic.  He stresses that
above all these liberties need to protect unpopular opinions, since ideas held by a
majority are rarely in danger of censorship. Burroughs agrees wholeheartedly, saying
quite directly “I think that all censorship, any form of censorship, should be abolished.  I
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don’t think so-called dirty books ever inspired anyone to commit any crime more serious
than masturbation” (The Job 70).  Mills’ approbation of free speech and unconventional
thought, which is echoed by both Dewey and Rorty, thus leads to (at least indirect)
approval of Burroughs’ work, which is the voicing of unpopular opinions in an
unconventional style.  This approval would have been deepened by Burroughs’ explicit
desire to voice his opinions so that individual liberty may be extended and strengthened.
Mill goes on to tackle a more difficult and complex problem in liberal politics,
describing the balance between the freedom of the individual to pursue self-perfection
and the needs of society to protect the common good:
The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make
himself a nuisance to other people.  But if he refrains from molesting
others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own
inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same
reasons which show that opinion should be free prove also that he should
be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his
own cost. (On Liberty 53)
Because Burroughs uses similar reasoning to arrive at the same conclusions about human
freedom, his literary work takes part in this liberal tradition of protecting and extending
rights.  The MOBist (“My Own Business”) attitude of Burroughs’ Johnsons is one of
toleration.  Rorty, Mill, and Burroughs all agree that we cannot have a free society if we
are going to pry into the private lives of our citizens, for “if the right to mind one’s own
business is recognized, the whole shit position is untenable” (Place of Dead Roads 155).
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Personal affairs cannot be legislated, because the laws which are supposed to punish
“immoral” behaviors inevitably become tools of authority for oppressing those seen as
somehow different from whatever normative standards might be proclaimed as “right”
for a given society.  In this tradition, a civilization which encourages (or even through
neglect allows) people to bully one another in the name of morality is neither civil nor
moral.
Much of what I have just explained for drugs about liberal freedoms could also be
applied to homosexuality, Burroughs’ second most popular symbol of personal
sovereignty.  Immediately after writing his first novel, Junky,  about the relationships
between drugs, drug users, and society, Burroughs directed his attention towards Queer,
his examination of his own sexuality and the social stigmas attached to his predilections.
Both these topics are perennial favorites for Burroughs, giving him opportunities to point
out all the differences between the Johnsons who engage in (or at least tolerate) these
pleasurable pursuits and the Shits of society who vilify both the practice and the
practitioners.  There is the longstanding religious component to the Shit mindset, which
Burroughs is eager to point out due to his loathing for organized religion in general and
Christianity in particular:  “And here is Reverend Braswell in the Denver Post:
‘Homosexuality is an abomination to God and should never be recognized as a legal
human right any more than robbery or murder’” (Place of Dead Roads 155).   Like drugs,
homosexuality is often equated with such egregious social ills as murder, but this simply
ignores Mill’s injunction that an individual is free to experiment and act “at his own
cost,” not at the expense of others.  Religious arguments like this are often combined with
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the  “social standards” that are supposedly violated by homosexuals, due to a variety of
myths about them, such as their uncontrollable promiscuity which spreads diseases, their
tendency to pederasty, and their desire to “convert” others to their lifestyle.  Throughout
his career as an ironist writer, Burroughs tries to dispel  these myths and the power they
have over him by redescribing it all.  At times he shocks us by repetitive graphic images,
such as that of the hanged man’s orgasm, which Allen Ginsberg (among others) suggests
is a veiled reference to the involuntary orgasm of the passive recipient of homosexual
intercourse.  At other times he describes homoerotic utopias, such as the world of the
Wild Boys, where the Shits and other homophobes of the world are the ones that fear for
their lives and safety, and gay men and boys can engage in their private pleasurable
pursuits without fear of censure or persecution.
Because sexual activity is such a private pursuit, it is not hard to see how the right
to pursue it as one wishes fits into our liberal tradition.  Like drug use, the question
should not be “Why should society allow it?”, but rather, “Why should society restrict
it?”.  Burroughs, in his own personal, contingent, idiosyncratic way, sees drug use and
homosexuality as liberating, as symbols of personal development and fulfillment.  This
unusual sentiment is evidence of his individuality in a liberal society, where (ideally, as
least) artists, eccentrics, and other takers of the road less traveled are free to develop new
and strange modes of living and expressing themselves.  Mill cautions us that without
such people and their unpopular ideas, society is liable to stagnation, and regardless of
whether or not the majority of people can see value in what oddballs have to offer, a
liberal society ought to nonetheless foster individuality, because
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To give any fair play to the nature of each, it is essential that different
persons should be allowed to lead different lives.  In proportion as this
latitude has been exercised in any age has that age been noteworthy to
posterity.  Even despotism does not produce its worst effects so long as
individuality exists under it; and whatever crushes individuality is
despotism, by whatever name it may be called and whether it professes to
be enforcing the will of God or the injunctions of men. (On Liberty 61)
Burroughs spent a lifetime enlarging the boundaries imposed by religious morality and
other traditional community standards of behavior, rejecting their dogmas in order to
make room for new visions of both society and the individual.  He believed that only
through a combination of self-education and self-deprogramming could one get beyond
the controls imposed by society and think freely for oneself.  His works, as a whole, are
descriptions of ways in which he has attempted to free himself from such controls, and he
uses them to present readers with instructions on how to follow his example.
Burroughs felt that human beings could and must make radical changes in
themselves and their world, or else we face certain destruction at the hands of our
controllers. Most of his earliest work was focused on his critiques of culture and
government; works such as Junkie, Queer, Naked Lunch, and the Nova trilogy focus on
what is wrong with our logocentric ways of thinking, our corporate culture of greed and
exploitation, and our racist, homophobic, intolerant attitudes. Gradually, as part of his
critique of American society and Western culture, he presented his model of the ideal
liberal ironist, the Johnson, and several different kinds of new societies in which such a
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person might live.
How does one become a liberal ironist?  Rorty suggests that reading widely is a
crucial part of the process; we become aware of the limitations of a given vocabulary
only by seeing it in relation to other vocabularies. Eventually, given a wide range of
exposure to different systems of thought and expression, we come to realize that any
vocabulary has holes and gaps, and no single one is any more “right” in the abstract than
another; they only have more or less applicability to the problems at hand in relation to
others.  Like Rorty, Burroughs felt that once people discard the notion that there is such a
thing as “human nature,” and begin to play with vocabularies rather than enshrining them
as sacrosanct and immutable, then they will begin to see possibilities for self-
transformation, rather than seeing only rules and limitations.  He used the slogan, “if
nothing is true, then everything is permitted.  That is, if we realize that everything is an
illusion, then any illusion is permitted.  As soon as we say that something is true, real,
then immediately things are not permitted” (The Job 97).  He says that if we can attain an
ironist’s detachment about final vocabularies, then any final vocabulary can be
considered without being invested as an authority.  As long as we hold the
metaphysician’s attachment to only one perspective, then our investments in that
perspective will lead us to believe there is a “Truth,”  which for him is the source of the
Shit attitude:  the adamant adherence to some particular, idiosyncratic vocabulary as
“Truth,” regardless of contradictory evidence or the disastrous outcomes which will result
from acting on this “Truth.”  In Burroughs’ mind, such belief-systems are
rationalizations, for “Truth has nothing to do with facts.  Those who manipulate Truth to
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their advantage, the people of the Big Lie, are careful to shun facts.  In fact nothing is
more deeply offensive to such people than the concept of fact.  To adduce fact in your
defense is to rule yourself out of court” (Ghost of Chance 7).  As a pragmatic thinker,
Burroughs is always interested in the evidence, the “facts” of a given situation, such as
medical evidence about the effects of drugs as opposed to all the drug-hysteria myths
about drug-taking.  Burroughs wants to obtain data, weigh and consider it, then arrive at a
conclusion.  Shits, in his opinion, already have a specific answer in mind to most
questions, such as those of drug policy, and facts can only hinder them from obtaining the
outcomes they desire.  Facts actually offend such manipulators because using facts
depends upon having a non-authoritarian perspective which is utterly alien to the Shit
mindset.  Such people either are an authority or work as an agent of it, slavishly
following the dictates of convention, such as the church or government.  To bring up
facts is to question the veracity of the authority on which they depend as an infallible
source of “Truth.”  Shits cannot appreciate irony, for they abhor the very concept of
competing viewpoints and work ruthlessly to eliminate all such competition from
consideration.
In order to free us from this kind of thinking, much of Burroughs’ work from the
mid-60’s on concerns the edification of the reader in ways of becoming a Johnson, and
like Rorty’s method, the transformation occurs through guided experience.  In addition to
his own works, a Burroughs-style reading list would include Count Korzybski, Wilhelm
Reich, Jack Black’s You Can’t Win, L. Ron Hubbard, Jean Genet, and Denton Welchv.
But Burroughs is a novelist interested in going beyond the confines of normal reading
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experiences, so his process of edification would not stop at a reading list.  In The Job, he
first proposes his “Academy 23,” which is really a training program for Johnsons.  The
goal is to help people restructure their entire thought process.  This new way of thinking
“is the thinking you would do if you didn’t have to think about any of the things you
ordinarily think about if you had no work to do nothing to be afraid of no plans to make”
(The Job 91).  As we have already seen in the previous chapter on cut-ups and other
Burroughs techniques, Burroughs always has a specific outcome in mind, which is to lead
us out of our typical, everyday patterns of thought, thus allowing for new, more adaptive,
more constructive patterns to take hold.  To make such radical changes in one’s thinking,
one cannot rely on the printed word, or on any sort of word-based experience alone, since
Burroughs sees language as the root of the problem.  He proposes a wide range of
edifying experiences:
The students would receive a basic course of training in the non-chemical
discipline of Yoga, karate, prolonged sense withdrawal, stroboscopic
lights, the constant use of tape recorders to break down verbal association
lines. . . after basic training the student would be prepared for drug trips to
reach areas difficult to explore by other means in the present state of our
knowledge. (The Job 137-38)
As a pragmatic thinker, Burroughs sees value in obtaining as wide a range of experiences
as possible, leading us out of stale metaphors and worn-out paths of thought into a more
mature and adaptable frame of mind.  The purpose is “decontrol of opinion,” meaning a
state in which all our verbal and cultural conditioning does not control us, for we have
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become aware of those patterns and we have mentally grown beyond their narrow
confines (The Job 138).
In Cities of the Red Night, he sketches a picture of an Academy 23 student, Yen
Lee, a man of great insight and discerning judgment:
Unlike his counterparts in western countries, he had been carefully
selected for a high level of intuitive adjustment, and trained accordingly to
imagine and explore seemingly fantastic potentials in any situation, while
at the same time giving equal consideration to prosaic and practical
aspects.  He had developed an attitude at once probing and impersonal,
remote and alert. He did not know when the training had begun, since in
Academy 23 it was carried out in a context of reality. (13)
In other words, Yen Lee has learned to use his imaginative powers to develop creative
ideas and solutions to problems, while also developing a habit of considering the cash-
value of those imaginings and using practical talents to put them into practice.  Through
the example of such characters, Burroughs encourages his readers to liberate their minds
of the effects of Control so that they may become tolerant, adaptable Johnsons.  But
because Shits and Johnsons have antithetical aims, Burroughs goes on to suggest new
societies in which Johnsons would not have to suffer under the cruel and intolerant rule
of Shits.
The first such picture of a new society is his homoerotic utopia, the world of the
Wild Boys.  This is not a place but rather a mobile community, composed entirely of
young boys and men.  In his desire to rub out what he sees as the three centers of control,
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the nation, the family, and reproduction, Burroughs postulates societies of boys which
transcend national boundaries and do not need females to produce offspring.  Although
the appeal of such a society is obviously limited, Burroughs presents a picture of an
alternative community completely free from conventional governmental structures,
family structures, or other overt systems of control.
Around the same time as the Wild Boys, Burroughs began developing his ideas
about voluntary communities that included both men and women, based on his values of
personal liberty and the M.O.B. (My Own Business) principle.  This idea, developed in
several essays and novels, parallels Mill’s statements about private pursuits:  society need
regulate them only when they directly and negatively affect other people.  A M.O.B.ist is
one who recognizes the sovereignty of the individual and goes about his own business
quietly without desiring that others should act as he does, since  “what other people do is
other people’s business” (Adding Machine 15).  Adherence to the M.O.B. principle
makes Johnsons excellent citizens for Rorty’s ideal liberal democracy, because they are
liberal enough to see that protecting their own rights and interests necessarily involves
recognizing the corresponding rights and interests of other citizens as well.  They are
ironist enough to see that their own final vocabulary and private dreams of self-perfection
are contingent and idiosyncratic, so they can tolerate other people who have different
final vocabularies and ideas of self-perfection.  The only kind of self-fulfillment that is
alien to the Johnson attitude is that which depends upon coercing others.  Eschewing
coercion certainly fits well with Rorty’s ideas about avoiding cruelty.  Furthermore, they
are liberally compassionate in the Rortyean sense, for “A Johnson minds his own
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business.  But he will help when help is needed.  He doesn’t stand by while someone is
drowning or trapped in a wrecked car” (Adding Machine 74).  Johnsons recognize the
cash-value of human solidarity.
While working off of the My Own Business principle, such communities would
still have to be placed within existing national boundaries, and so still be subject to some
restrictions, but Burroughs believed they could be structured so as to ameliorate many of
the worst features of governmental and social control, and in time such communities
might grow beyond the nation-state.  He believed this could be done
by the withdrawal of like-minded individuals into separate communities
within nations.  The Black Muslims are moving in that direction.  So are
the Hippies.  Other preferential units could be set up:  all male
communities, ESP communities, health communities, karate and judo
communities, glider balloonist communities, yoga communities, Reichian
communities, silence and sense-withdrawal communities.  Such
communities would soon become international and break down national
borders. (The Job 98-99)
Burroughs goes on to present such societies in his second trilogy and in Ghost of Chance.
Using historical information, Burroughs pictures the free pirate societies of the
Eighteenth Century as forerunners of his envisioned communes:  “The liberal principles
embodied in the French and American revolutions and later in the liberal revolutions of
1848 had already been codified and put into practice by pirate communes a hundred years
earlier” (Cities of the Red Night xi).  These liberal principles include democratic rule and
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guaranteed rights and liberties for the citizens secured in a document Burroughs calls the
Articles.  Later, in Ghost of Chance, Burroughs enumerates specifically some of these
rights:  “there would be no capital punishment, no slavery, no imprisonment for debt, and
no interference with religion or sexuality” (57).  By guaranteeing freedom of conscience
and individual liberty, Burroughs places his ideal society firmly in the tradition of
Jefferson and Mill.  It also blends with Rorty’s ideas about a liberal society as dedicated
to the reduction of human suffering, because Burroughs envisions such societies as a
haven of liberty for those under the yoke of control, especially colonial control, open to
“all those who are enslaved and oppressed throughout the world, from the sugar
plantations of the West Indies, the whole Indian population of the American Continent
peonized and degraded by the Spanish into sub-human poverty and ignorance” (Cities of
the Red Night xiii).  He goes on to describe his free societies as outlets for those suffering
from the ill effects of the industrial revolution as well, absorbing all those who flee urban
slums seeking relief from economic exploitation.  Burroughs depicts all such sufferers
banding together in human solidarity, struggling for freedom from the oppressive regimes
of the Shits.
Just as the Shits have their goal, which is Control, Johnsons also have a goal,
freedom.  For Burroughs, the greatest symbol of freedom from Control is space travel, so
his ideal Johnson communities are dedicated to the realization of a working space
program:  “to achieve complete freedom from past conditioning is to be in space” (The
Adding Machine 138).   This is not a predestined goal, because the outcome of the
struggle between Johnsons and Shits is still in doubt.  Burroughs believes that we have
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the potential for space travel, but we have to take concrete, difficult, dangerous steps in
order to realize this possibility.  Additionally, Burroughs views space travel not just as an
end in itself, but pragmatically  as a concrete goal which could give human beings a
greater sense of solidarity if they could unite and work together.  He sees Earth a “death
camp,” subject at any moment to nuclear or biological warfare, environmental disasters,
and plagues, any of which could wipe out humanity.  Burroughs uses images of violent
struggle between Shits and Johnsons in order to stress how high the stakes are in this
game:  “The Johnsons kill to rid the spaceship Earth of malefactors who are sabotaging
our space program.  It’s like you see somebody knocking holes in the bottom of the
lifeboat and shitting in the water supply” (The Place of Dead Roads 167).
Planned apocalypse, or “Nova” as Burroughs called it, is the ending that has been
“pre-recorded” on the Reality Film by Control.  During his period of experimentation
with tape recorders, film, and other cut-up media, Burroughs began to use the metaphors
of those media in his writing.  He postulated that by means of media control and the
Word Virus, the agents of control were “pre-recording” the outcomes of important
events, including the end of the world, onto a film track he called the “Reality Film.”
This Reality Film is repetitive and dull, for it embodies the Shit values of mindless
conformity and submission to authority.  As was discussed in Chapter Two, cut-ups are a
primary means of disrupting the pre-recorded outcomes, but for each successful
disruption there may be many failures.  The best way to break out of the Reality Film of
Control is to push humanity into space, where we have the potential for limitless
experimentation in different modes of living, due to unlimited horizons: “the future of
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any artifact lies in the direction of increased flexibility, capacity for change, and
ultimately, mutation” (The Adding Machine 136).
Burroughs symbolically connects space, silence, and creativity in a way which
suggests that the Johnsons’ goal of space travel represents greater personal, artistic, and
political freedom for human beings, while the Shits’ goal of total Control represents
stagnation, repression, and extinction.  Human beings will have to undergo radical
change in order to move into space, which is exactly what the Shits don’t want, since they
always strive to maintain the oppressive status quo.  Only Johnsons will be willing to take
the steps necessary:  “to travel in space, you must leave the old verbal garbage behind:
God talk, country talk, mother talk, love talk, party talk.  You must learn to exist with no
religion, no country, no allies.  You must learn to live alone in silence” (The Adding
Machine 138).  The Word Virus is the principal Shit tool of control, so only those who
have divested themselves of it can achieve freedom.  When the conditioning created and
reinforced by the Word, by society, and by religion is removed and overcome, then one is
in space in silence, a condition of adaptability and increased capacity for change.
Burroughs uses metaphors of biology, calling this step into space an evolutionary step for
human beings, away from the Slave Gods, for “in the beginning was the word and the
word was God.  And what does that make us?  Ventriloquist’s dummies.  Time to leave
the Word-God behind” (The Adding Machine 105).  Burroughs also connects this new
state with creativity, linking artists and imaginative vision with the more free conditions
of space:  “Artists and creative thinkers will lead the way into space because they are
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already writing, painting, and filming space.  They are providing us with the only maps
for space travel” (The Adding Machine 104).
This meshes thematically with Rorty’s vision of his ideal society, one in which
human beings work together in solidarity, enjoy a wider range of freedoms, and have
almost unlimited vistas for imaginative exploration and narratives of self-creation.
Burroughs explicitly describes space as a place where there are no longer pre-recorded
outcomes, no more Controllers:  “we are not setting out to explore static pre-existing
data.  We are setting out to create new worlds, new beings, new modes of consciousness”
(The Adding Machine 104).  Space is his symbol of the ideal free, liberal, creative
society.
The picture I have been painting of Burroughs shows, I hope, his pragmatic
visions of American society and the kinds of people he sees in it.  Like Rorty, Burroughs
is concerned about the balance between conformity and solidarity, between liberty and
authority, and he wants to show that both solidarity and individual liberty are values that
we should strive to enlarge and encourage.  Neither author wants to sacrifice one value
for the other.  Both of them are working out of a liberal tradition that goes back to the
eighteenth century, yet trying to bring the values of this tradition into our own times,
applying them to current conditions.
109
                                                          
i Burroughs originally published Naked Lunch with Maurice Girodias’ Olympia Press, because no other
publishing house would touch it.  Once this European edition began to sell, Grove Press of New York
agreed to publish an American edition, although the excerpts of Naked Lunch which had been issued by the
small, Chicago-based literary journal Big Table had already run into seizure problems.  To no one’s
surprise, the post office in Boston confiscated the Grove edition of Naked Lunch, leading to a highly
publicized trial in which major figures in literature, such as Norman Mailer and Allen Ginsberg, were
called upon to explain why Naked Lunch passed the Supreme Court’s litmus test of “redeeming social
value.”  The defense succeeded, and as Jennie Skerl put it, “Naked Lunch was the last literary work to be
subjected to a major censorship trial in the United States and marked the end of an era that began in the
1870’s when the crusader Anthony Comstock persuaded federal and state governments to create and
enforce stricter obscenity laws” (36).  Those wishing to study this important case in more detail should
consult Michael Barry Goodman’s book, Contemporary Literary Censorship:  The Case History of
Burroughs’ Naked Lunch.
ii Burroughs was living in Mexico City with his wife, Joan, and their two children.  They frequently ran
short of money, and Burroughs pawned or sold personal items to make ends meet.  On September sixth,
1951, William and Joan went to a friend’s apartment to sell one of his handguns.  They were drinking
heavily, and in a drunken haze Burroughs suddenly decided it was time for a “William Tell routine.”
Although this was not something they had done before, Joan joined in the sport by immediately putting her
cocktail glass on her head.  William sighted carefully and was usually an excellent marksman, but an
inaccurate gun and drunken reflexes resulted in a fatal shot to Joan’s temple.  Although shocked and
grieved by the act, Burroughs did not turn away from firearms after this incident.  He later claimed that
were it not for Joan’s death, he would probably not have become the writer that he did.  He was also led to
postulate his theory of alien possession by the “Ugly Spirit,” which he blamed for controlling him and
causing Joan’s death.
iii “Short-con” means the small-time hustlers who exploit marks (victims) with petty tricks for relatively
small amounts of money or goods.  The short-con is an art in itself, requiring quick hands and a sharp wit,
but it entails less risk than the “long” con, which often requires heavy investments of time, money, and
effort.  The short con can usually be done alone or with a single partner, whereas the long con often
requires a team effort.
iv In the Soft Machine, Burroughs gives another passage in which a primary controller, the “District
Supervisor,” tries to appeal to racist sentiments as a way of promoting divisions amongst people:  “Now kid
what are you doing over there with the niggers and the apes?  Why don’t you straighten out and act like a
white man?—After all they’re only human cattle—You know that yourself—Hate to see a bright young
man fuck up and get off on the wrong track—“ (149)  See also Nova Express page 177 for another example
of Shits using race-baiting as a control technique.
v Count Alfred Korzybski founded the theory of General Semantics, from which Burroughs took his ideas
about the contingency of language.  Burroughs also saw Korzybski as a persecuted thinker, excluded and
hounded by the Shits because his ideas were threatening to expose their Word Virus control system.
Wilhelm Reich was a proponent of an alternative theory of medicine, based on his “orgones,” minute life
particles which were generated by living creatures.  All diseases were supposedly caused by a lack of or
degeneration of the body’s orgones.  L. Ron Hubbard was a science fiction author and one of the founders
of Scientology.  Although Burroughs borrowed some concepts from Scientology, he later became
disenchanted with the organization because of its cult-like, controlling atmosphere.  Jean Genet was a
French writer whom Burroughs both read and knew personally.  Burroughs admired him as a writer of
talent and a fellow outcast from respectable society.  Denton Welch was an obscure English writer who
died at a young age.  Burroughs liked his prose style and his open homosexuality.
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CONCLUSION
WHAT SHOULD WE TAKE AWAY FROM ALL THIS?
In this work I have presented a pragmatic view of the works of William
Burroughs using ideas from Richard Rorty and John Dewey, but like all viewpoints, this
privileges some issues while ignoring others.  What about Rorty’s elitism, or Burroughs’
misogyny?  Although I would like to deal with every important issue for both authors, to
maintain focus it was necessary for me to pick those issues that most clearly show the
relationship between William Burroughs and the tradition of American pragmatic
thought: pragmatic techniques and liberal themes.  Dewey tells us there is room for both
synthesis, or breaking things up into parts and looking at details, and analysis, which is
looking at the bigger picture.  This conclusion is a good place for drawing some more
general connections and recognizing those areas which still remain relatively unexplored.
Richard Rorty has done a lot to revive pragmatism and bring it back into critical
discussion in his own field of philosophy.  This is good news for us in American studies,
since pragmatism is our only native philosophical tradition.  He has also prompted
discussion on the relationship between the humanities and culture by suggesting that
literature has been and remains a more effective way of promoting ideas and influencing
social structures than philosophy.  This assertion deals not only with content but also with
style, suggesting that a narrative format is more apprehensible than an argumentative one.
Because I agree with his idea, I have followed him by writing this paper in more of a
literary style than a philosophical one.  Although it is certainly worthwhile for us
literary/cultural studies critics to understand philosophy, that does not mean that we have
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to try to write like Wittgenstein or Derrida.  In fact, if we really want to be able to
perform the work of critics, which Dewey says is to promote the public’s understanding
of works of art, then it is counterproductive for us to use inflated, arcane prose when
simpler, more direct wording would do.  If a philosopher like Rorty can write in a more
casual, descriptive style, why can’t we literary critics?  If the public cannot understand
what we academics are writing, then they will continue to think that what we do has little
to no meaning for their lives.  And they are probably right to think so.
The problem of the marginalization of the humanities and their increasing
irrelevancy to American life is examined in detail in John J. Stuhr’s Genealogical
Pragmatism:  Philosophy, Experience, and Community.  Stuhr convincingly describes the
corporatization of higher education as a trend which has been either ignored or abetted by
the humanities, leaving us academicians three options:  continue to wane and diminish in
our ivory tower, embrace “edu-business” by turning the humanities into a service
industry, or become entertainers by shifting our analyses into marketable pop-culture
phenomenon.  Stuhr rejects all three options, but he warns that as things now stand, we
may be forced to choose from among these three unappealing options:
Let me be very clear here.  No better option now is available to humanists
as humanists—in their present professional roles or current activities as
humanists.  Better options are available to any persons—including
professional humanists—who are willing and able to engage the public—
citizens, legislators, journalists, foundation heads, the business
community, politicians, and others who do not determine teaching
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schedules, fix course prerequisites, approve research leaves, grant tenure,
or award merit pay. (20)
Pragmatism, with its focus on tying specific ideas to specific outcomes, offers new ways
of looking at current practices, including our writing styles.  In this dissertation, I have
tried to write in a manner that is both professional and (I hope) accessible to those who
do not have advanced degrees but do have an interest in literature and philosophy.  But
Stuhr is correct in saying that there are no easy, obvious answers available right now.
The tension between how we academics see ourselves and public perception of us is one
that we had better resolve. We in the humanities remain passive during this time of
change at our own peril.
Rorty also has some unresolved tensions in his work, especially the public/private
split which comes out of the foundationalist/ironist division.  First of all, it isn’t clear yet
just how the public/private split is supposed to work.  Most people engaged in public
discourse do so out of privately held positions, meaning they arise out of people’s
idiosyncratic Final Vocabulary.  Rorty needs to explain more clearly how public issues
are supposed to be discussed without dipping into private values.  Perhaps he means our
discussions of laws and policies should work using a vocabulary of democratic and
liberal values and rights, and a pragmatic discourse would also include examination of
the specific context of the issues in question at the moment.  For example, a public
discussion of gay marriage could sidestep the whole religious controversy by avoiding
the term “marriage,” which brings up Final Vocabulary values for many people, and
using the term “civil union” or other such appellation.  Such a discussion would avoid
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debating what is “natural” for humans in terms of sexual orientation or what God
commands people with respect to companionship, and instead would rely on what rights
for the pursuit of happiness and self-fulfillment are at stake.  The discussion would also
try to avoid generalized arguments over principles by putting out specific suggestions
regarding the laws which would govern civil unions, and examining specific policies
which would be affected, such as rights of inheritance and tax codes.  More questions on
the public/private split remain, but the idea is useful if it can help us turn away from
endless argument and move us towards action in the public sector.
The potential elitism of being an ironist concerns me, although Rorty often
implies that intellectuals are the only ones who need to be ironists.  If we are going to try
as a culture to move beyond foundationalism, we will undoubtedly run into the problem
of people who don’t want to leave it behind.  For Burroughs, things are quite simple:
Shits are the source of most of society’s problems, and they ought to be removed from
power and even killed when necessary.  Burroughs tells us quite directly that
foundationalists (at least the most extreme kind, those I called zealots) cannot and will
not allow ironists to pursue their dreams of freedom and self-creation, so those ironist
Johnsons have to either remove themselves and create new societies, or violently
overthrow the Shits and their repressive institutions.  Rorty, as a liberal pragmatist who
wants improvement in society rather than revolution, clearly cannot advocate this route.  I
cannot either, although sometimes I understand Burroughs’ frustration with people who
want society or government to play the father figure and protect citizens from themselves.
This is the fundamental tension that both authors wrestle with but cannot resolve:  how
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shall we have a society which can reconcile the conservative values of foundationalists
with the free-form experimentalism of ironists?  There is a line we must draw between
foundationalists’ desire to live according to their principles and ironists’ desire to
experiment with new ideas and practices freely.  We must recognize people’s right to
advocate the values they hold without allowing them to coerce others, or allowing them
to legislate the government into coercing for them.
Burroughs goes a bit too far when he tries to paint all authority figures as evil and
all foundationalists as cruel.  Not all Christians are meddlesome or interested in
persecuting homosexuals, and by demonizing Shits so vehemently he seems in danger of
being just as much of an extremist as he makes them out to be.  Burroughs is of value not
because we should take his advice literally, but because the dreams and values of the
individual are advocated too little in public discourse; the emphasis is most often on the
need for structure, order, and “traditional values,” whatever those may be.  Burroughs is
not just a parodist, for he does offer some positive, constructive visions of individuals and
societies, namely the Johnson family.  His idea here is simple but appealing:  mind your
own business and let others do the same, involving yourself only when others need and
ask for your help.  Burroughs is worth paying attention to because he is a champion of
individual liberty, and in a world where technology offers society and government more
and more ways for monitoring, categorizing, and influencing private behavior, we
pursuers of private dreams need all the defenders we can get.
Because of technology and increasing centralization of both government and
corporate structures, Burroughs’ theories about control of the mind through word and
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image addiction are of interest to everyone.  Even if you are a foundationalist, you may
not like the Word Lines that are being laid down, and Burroughs offers both an
understanding of the control system and how to free oneself from it.  If combined with
current media analyses and linguistics, Burroughs’ ideas about language and image could
be even more valuable.
Finally, Burroughs’ push for humanity’s move into space has value both on the
literal and the symbolic level. Symbolically, space represents silence and freedom from
conditioning.  Learning to create silence within one’s own mind by shutting down the
Word (at least temporarily) is recognized as a valuable practice in almost every spiritual
tradition:  meditation in Buddhism, rosary chanting in Catholicism, fasting and vision
questing in Native American paths, etc.  Similar techniques are taught scientifically in
biofeedback programs.  Creating some silence within ourselves and tapping into our
internal resources for greater peace of mind and creativity could not only benefit us
individually, but could help create that Johnson family of self-sufficient individuals who
help each other out when needed.
As a pragmatic thinker, Burroughs reminds us that outcomes are tied to practices:
“Happiness is a by-product of function.”  Here at the end of the cold war, without a great
Communist enemy to defeat, the space program seems antiquated.  But if it were to be
promoted as a world-wide venture, drawing resources and talents from countries all over
the globe, an ambitious space program could be an invaluable tool for promoting human
solidarity by fixing our sights on this common goal.  This unity of purpose could help
draw nations into better dialogues and help them become more accustomed to working
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together instead of arguing and competing, as so often seems to be the case now.
Diverting some of our massive military budgets into a constructive, cooperative space
program could create historical opportunities.  Let us do everything we can to create a
world in which Nova is no longer a daily possibility.
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